Abstract
Iterative combinatorial auctions are widely used in high stakes settings such as spectrum auctions. Such auctions can be hard to understand analytically, making it difficult for bidders to determine how to behave and for designers to optimize auction rules to ensure desirable outcomes such as high revenue or welfare. In this paper, we investigate whether multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithms can be used to understand iterative combinatorial auctions, given that these algorithms have recently shown empirical success in several other domains. We find that MARL can indeed benefit auction analysis, but that deploying it effectively is nontrivial. We begin by describing modelling decisions that keep the resulting game tractable without sacrificing important features such as imperfect information or asymmetry between bidders. We also discuss how to navigate pitfalls of various MARL algorithms, how to overcome challenges in verifying convergence, and how to generate and interpret multiple equilibria. We illustrate the promise of our resulting approach by using it to evaluate a specific rule change to a clock auction, finding substantially different auction outcomes due to complex changes in bidders' behavior.
Abstract (translated)
迭代组合拍卖在高风险场景（如频谱拍卖）中得到了广泛应用。这样的拍卖很难用分析方法来理解，使得买家无法确定如何行动，设计师也无法优化拍卖规则以确保实现好的结果（如高收益或福利）。在本文中，我们研究是否可以使用多智能体强化学习（MARL）算法来理解迭代组合拍卖，因为这些算法最近在多个领域取得了经验上的成功。我们发现，MARL确实可以有益于拍卖分析，但有效地部署它并不容易。我们首先描述了保持模型在不牺牲重要特征（如不完美信息或买家的不对称性）的情况下保持游戏可导性的建模决策。我们还讨论了如何应对各种MARL算法的陷阱，如何克服验证收敛的挑战，以及如何生成和解释多个均衡。我们通过使用该方法对一个具体的时钟拍卖规则进行评估，发现由于买家的行为复杂变化，拍卖结果差异很大。
URL
https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.19420
