Large language models (LLMs) are improving rapidly as reflected in benchmark scores, yet these AI benchmarks largely test capabilities such as factual recall, narrow question answering, mathematical problem-solving, and coding and agentic tool-use. What remains poorly measured is AI progress on the analytical knowledge work white-collar professionals perform daily, including synthesizing complex information, exercising judgment under uncertainty and incomplete information, applying strategic and adversarial thinking in multi-stakeholder settings, weighing trade-offs, and producing defensible, structured analyses. This gap is even more pronounced for subjective components of such work, where success can be challenging to define. The "case method" form of education practiced by top business schools provides a natural foundation for addressing this measurement gap, and we construct BusinessCaseBench, a benchmark spanning hundreds of questions drawn from business cases across eighteen disciplines, each paired with a grading rubric derived from the expert-written instructor case solution. On BusinessCaseBench, frontier AI models already score highly against instructor rubrics, and capability within one model family improves substantially over two years. These results provide strong evidence that AI performance on this class of work is already high and rapidly improving, with implications for business schools, where case pedagogy trains undergraduates and MBAs in this kind of analytical reasoning, and for entry-level professional roles, where such skills have historically anchored early-career work.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.16057
Multimodal AI agents increasingly rely on persistent long-term memory to ground generation in past visual and textual episodes. We show that unconditional trust in visual data creates a critical vulnerability. We propose Lucid, a black-box adversarial framework that compromises multimodal memory pipelines under a strictly image-bounded threat model, requiring no access to the target MLLM, target retrieval encoder, or the text channel. Lucid crafts imperceptible perturbations to enable two distinct failure modes based on the availability of historical context: (1) Memory poisoning, an in-context attack where the adversarial image replaces a benign one whose content is reinforced by prior textual context, reliably corrupting visual recall and steering the agent toward attacker-chosen narratives; (2) Memory injection, an out-of-context attack where the adversarial image replaces a benign one in a conversation turn devoid of prior textual grounding, causing the agent to generate attacker-influenced responses with no corrective signal from memory. We evaluate Lucid across various conversation domains and five black-box memory architectures, including graph-structured, LLM-summarized, and commercially deployed systems. Lucid achieves 61.6% ASR on poisoning and 58.4% ASR on injection, exposing a structural vulnerability in multimodal memory pipelines.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.15657
Poisoning pretraining data can introduce harmful behaviors to LMs that are difficult to detect and mitigate. Prior work on poisoning pretraining data has largely exploited established data sources such as Wikipedia, which do not represent the large scale and heterogeneity typical of pretraining corpora, and has ignored the interaction between poisoned data and data curation pipelines. We demonstrate that poisoning attacks on pretraining data are feasible beyond this limited setting through an existing web-scale content injection mechanism: public discussion interfaces. Additionally, to measure whether malicious content is included after web crawling and data curation, we introduce HalfLife, a novel analysis for estimating adversarial content inclusion in web-crawl based LM training data. We use HalfLife to explore the feasibility of poisoning pretraining corpora at web scale through open discussion interfaces. Our analysis demonstrates the importance of estimating whether poison injections are included in pretraining data, and establishes third-party webpage content as a possible vector for attacking language model pretraining.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.15267
The reliability of deepfake detectors frequently degrades under black-box adversarial transfer, as these models often rely on fragile, architecture-dependent forensic cues. Existing transfer attacks often lack semantic awareness and struggle to maintain effectiveness under strict no-query constraints, particularly when perturbations are transferred from convolutional surrogates to transformer-based targets. To address these limitations, this paper introduces ARMOR++, a robust multi-agent framework designed for high-transferability deepfake evasion. The framework leverages the Qwen2.5-VL Vision-Language Model (VLM) to supply spatial semantic priors, while the Qwen3 Large Language Model (LLM) orchestrates primitive selection, adaptive hyperparameter reparameterization, and entropy-regularized perturbation mixing. By integrating five complementary primitives, spanning dense optimization, saliency-based methods, spatial transformations, frequency-domain perturbations, and block-structured modifications, ARMOR++ effectively targets heterogeneous inductive biases. Rigorous evaluation on the AADD-2025 benchmark demonstrates that ARMOR++ significantly outperforms existing agentic and non-agentic baselines across both low- and high-quality image regimes. Statistical analysis confirms a substantial gain in blind-target Attack Success Rate (ASR) over the state-of-the-art agentic baseline, with further performance advantages evidenced against non-agentic benchmarks and under robust defensive configurations. These findings highlight a significant residual reliability gap in current deepfake detector deployments and demonstrate the efficacy of agentic orchestration in identifying latent vulnerabilities.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.15246
World-action models (WAMs) are emerging as a promising foundation for embodied control: rather than predicting actions alone, they learn representations that couple action generation with future world prediction. This coupling is often viewed as a source of robustness, interpretability, and safety, as a robot's action can in principle be checked against its imagined future. In this paper, we show that this assumption is fragile. We introduce BadWAM, a unified framework for modeling and evaluating World-Action Drift Attacks: a new class of WAM-specific adversarial attacks that use small visual perturbations to break the alignment between what a WAM imagines and what it executes. BadWAM characterizes this attack surface along two natural criteria: attack strength and stealthiness. When the adversary prioritizes disruption, BadWAM instantiates an action-only adversarial attack, which directly drives the model toward task-failing actions. When the adversary additionally prioritizes stealth, BadWAM instantiates an imagination-preserving adversarial attack, which seeks to induce harmful action shifts while keeping the model's predicted future close to its clean imagination. Together, these two attacks capture a spectrum of WAM-specific failures: from overt action hijacking to stealthier cases where the model appears to imagine a plausible future but executes a desynchronized action. We evaluate BadWAM across different variants of WAMs. Results show that our attacks substantially reduce task success rates under closed-loop execution. For example, our action-only attack reduces the model performance from 96.5% to 43.1% success. The results of our imagination-preserving attack further exposes a WAM-specific vulnerability: moderate future-preserving regularization can maintain strong attack performance while reducing future imagination drift.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.15207
Vision-Language Pre-training Models (VLPMs) are known to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Recent transferable attacks on VLPMs have followed a common pipeline with complicated loss functions or multi-stage text/image attacks. However, in this paper, we demonstrate that such a sophisticated attack pipeline can be simpler yet more successful. Specifically, we identify three previously overlooked issues caused by inappropriate cross-modal interactions and excessive operations. To address them, we propose the Simple Vision-Language Attack (SimVLA) pipeline, which observably improves transferability and efficiency. Experiments on four datasets and three downstream tasks validate the superiority of our pipeline. For instance, on Flickr30k text-image retrieval dataset, our SimVLA outperforms the SOTA baseline in R@1 transferability by 8.01\%-14.71\%, while consuming only about 35.73\% of the time and 46.26\% of the max VRAM. Overall, the superiority of our SimVLA highlights the importance of leveraging domain knowledge (e.g., our proposed cross-modal word identification), while blindly pursuing intricate operations (e.g, complex loss functions and redundant multi-stage designs) may even be harmful. We hope our SimVLA can serve as a simple yet effective backbone for future extensions. Code is available at this https URL.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.14974
State-of-the-art flow based text-to-image (T2I) models exhibit remarkable generative abilities but remain vulnerable to producing unsafe content. Prior safety efforts range from concept erasure and prompt filtering to classifier-based gating. However, simple techniques like parameter efficient adaptations of the models easily bypass such guardrails. We introduce a unique principled approach that achieves safety by regulating the model's attention dynamics through inference-time introspection, exhibiting intrinsic robustness. Our method analyzes and rebalances attention activations throughout image synthesis, steering generations away from unsafe concepts while preserving semantic alignment. This introspective control ensures safety of deployed models. Across standard and adversarial safety benchmarks, our approach achieves remarkable safety scores while maintaining or even improving alignment and perceptual quality. Our results reveal that attention-space regulation offers a considerably more promising path to safer diffusion transformer based image generation than the existing concept erasing this http URL code can be accessed at this https URL
https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.14945
Machine learning models are increasingly adapted in various domains. However, adversarial examples pose a significant threat to the reliable deployment of these models. In recent years, some powerful adversarial example attacks have been proposed for the fast and query-efficient generation of adversarial examples, even in black-box scenarios, highlighting the need for scalable, low-cost, and powerful defenses. In this work, we present two contributions to the domain of black-box adversarial example attacks and defenses. First, we propose Random Logit Scaling (RLS), a randomization-based defense against black-box score-based adversarial example attacks. RLS is a plug-and-play, post-processing defense that can be implemented on top of any existing ML model with minimal effort. The idea behind RLS is to confuse an attacker by outputting falsified scores resulting from randomly scaled logits while maintaining the model accuracy. We show that RLS significantly reduces the success rate of state-of-the-art black-box score-based attacks while preserving the accuracy and minimizing confidence score distortion compared to state-of-the-art randomization-based defenses. Second, we introduce a novel adaptive attack against AAA, a SOTA non-randomized black-box defense against black-box score-based attacks that also modifies output logits to confuse attackers, demonstrating its vulnerability against adaptive attacks.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.14921
Vision-language pre-trained models (VLPs) are widely used in real-world applications. However, they remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Although adversarial detection methods have demonstrated success in single-modality settings (either vision or language), their effectiveness and reliability in multimodal models such as VLPs remain largely unexplored. In this work, we study the geometry of VLP embedding spaces and observe structured anisotropy that differs from unimodal vision models. Our theoretical analysis shows that under this anisotropic structure, adversarial attacks increase the expected geometric separation between clean and adversarial examples (AEs). Specifically, we demonstrate that AEs consistently exhibit greater expected distances to randomly sampled points than their clean counterparts, indicating that AEs tend to push representations out of manifold regions. Building on these insights, we propose GeoDetect, which leverages these off-manifold deviations via geometric scores to identify AEs. Through comprehensive evaluations, we show that our approach reliably detects AEs across diverse VLP architectures and threat settings, covering unimodal and multimodal attacks as well as adaptive attacks, thereby providing a robust and practical approach to improving the safety and reliability of these models.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.14737
Deep learning models for prostate MRI-based cancer grading may encode clinical covariates that either reflect useful disease-related signal or non-generalising shortcut information, but their role is usually assumed. We propose a causal-reasoning framework for probing covariate dependence in MRI-based International Society of Urological Pathology (ISUP) Grade Group prediction. Rather than treating mpMRI as a direct cause of grade, we model MRI appearance and ISUP grade as observations of latent tumour pathology, and test whether candidate clinical variables act as nuisance correlates, disease-related proxies, or irrelevant covariates in the learned representation. We implement this using an adversarial framework that suppresses the decodability of individual clinical covariate at a time while preserving MRI-based grade prediction. The approach is developed and evaluated on 2,903 prostate MRI examinations, with external validation on 576 patients. We report a set of interesting and previously under-explored imaging-to-clinical-variable interactions in the context of deep learning generalisation. For examples, in binary ISUP Grade Group $\geq2$ classification, suppressing age, BMI, and alcohol use improved AUC by 1.23%, 0.84%, and 1.42%, respectively (all p < 0.05), suggesting reduced non-generalising covariate information; In contrast, suppressing PSA and prostate volume degraded AUC by 1.91% and 7.61% (all p < 0.001), indicating that these variables carried task-relevant signal. These findings show that adversarial covariate suppression can provide a practical representation-level analysis for distinguishing potentially harmful dependence from informative signal in prostate MRI grading models.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.14720
Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models have emerged as a powerful paradigm for general-purpose robot manipulation; however, their transition to real-world environments reveals vulnerabilities to minor environmental perturbations. We propose FLARE, an optimized physical spotlight attack framework that exploits these vulnerabilities via targeted illuminations, dropping baseline task success rates to zero without any access to model internals. While adversarial training is the standard countermeasure, we identify a critical and previously underestimated defensive pitfall: naive data augmentations incorrectly condition VLA models to discard color as noise, collapsing their visual perception into a purely shape-biased processor. We expose this degradation through a diagnostic grayscale evaluation, in which the defended model maintains high success rates on grayscale inputs, while its success rate on benign, color-dependent real-world tasks drops to at most 47.5%, well below the undefended baseline. To address this, we propose ChromaGuard, a chroma-preserving adversarial training method. On a physical 6-DoF robotic platform, we demonstrate that ChromaGuard achieves 97.5% and 92.5% success rates in benign and attacked color-dependent tasks, respectively.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.14698
Persistent external memory enhances agent continuity but introduces persistent security vulnerabilities: adversarial content can be injected via standard interaction channels, retained across turns, and later distort downstream behavior. To address this challenge, we propose MemPoison, a comprehensive benchmark and analysis framework featuring 1227 hand-validated cases across four attack types, three injection channels, and three representative memory substrates, evaluated on seven open-weight and three closed-weight model families. We introduce a three-tier taxonomy: (L1) direct single-record corruption, (L2) compositional multi-record corruption and (L3) context-triggered dormant corruption. Our evaluations reveal a distinct defense frontier: while baseline write-time defenses, such as consistency checks, substantially suppress direct L1 attacks, they fail to reliably suppress L2 and L3 attacks. Through mechanistic influence decomposition (MID), we demonstrate structural blind spots in write-time defenses, which admit seemingly benign records that later become harmful through joint retrieval composition or trigger-conditioned activation. Our findings advocate for shifting from static filtering to adaptive, context-sensitive memory defense strategies.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.14651
Abductive reasoning operates in two directions. The synthetic mode builds explanations from available hypotheses; the analytic mode, conversely, identifies the latent factors whose interaction accounts for a complex observed state. This paper develops the analytic mode as a non-greedy, risk-sensitive discipline of commitment, in which candidate factors coexist and interact, resolving into committed conclusions only when explicit governance conditions are met. The formal core is the $\kappa$-$\tau$ apparatus: $\kappa$ encodes the epistemic interaction among hypotheses, and $\tau$ sets a commitment threshold calibrated to the decision's stakes. The central contribution is the causal cluster, a structured object recording which latent factors participate in a decomposition, with what weights and interaction structure, together with a two-level architecture (intra-cluster $\kappa^*$, inter-cluster $\kappa^{**}$) that guards against causal misattribution. Demonstrated in epidemiological crisis decomposition and adversarial cyber threat analysis, the framework's contribution to human-AI reasoning is the legibility of suspended decomposition as a shared coordination object, providing structural resistance to premature convergence. In practice, the decision-maker is handed not a single imposed answer but the competing explanatory scenarios, weighted by plausibility and paired with the evidence that would resolve between them, so that sound action is possible even before the ambiguity is resolved.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.14641
A growing class of agentic systems maintain persistent state across sessions through memory files, behavioral preferences, and knowledge bases. While this makes agents more useful and self-improving, it also creates a new attack surface for prompt injections in which malicious instructions can be embedded within persistent files and influence future behavior. In this work, we study prompt injection attacks in memory-based agentic systems using a sandboxed synthetic workspace. We evaluate two agentic systems, Anthropic Claude Code and OpenAI Codex, across four models: Claude Haiku 4.5, Claude Opus 4.7, GPT-5.2, and GPT-5.5. Our results show that although it is difficult to make an agent overwrite its own memory files using untrusted external content, payloads already planted in those files can successfully attack current and future sessions. Attack success and payload persistence vary substantially across systems, models, adversarial goals, and multi-session attack sequences. These findings show that persistent memory changes the threat model for prompt injection and motivate defenses that protect memory updates without removing useful agent adaptation.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.14611
Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have made substantial advances on benchmarks, yet their real-world effectiveness remains uncertain. This gap stems from the fundamental misalignment between benchmarks in controlled, static settings and the dynamic, interactive, and contextualized nature of real-world applications. To bridge this gap, we propose CEDI (Contextualized Evaluations of MLLMs through Dynamic, multi-round Interactions), a framework that recasts evaluation as a three-party interaction between an evaluatee model, an automated examiner, and a grader. The examiner conducts multi-turn, semi-structured conversation guided by a graph-based representation of the task. By navigating state-space transitions, CEDI deploys diverse strategies, from clarification requests to adversarial probes, to elicit performance evidence. We apply CEDI to visual hallucinations. Empirical results across multiple models, diverse settings, datasets, and domains show that contextualized, interactive evaluations reveal not only significantly more hallucinations than conventional static evaluation but also ones that more closely resemble those arising in practical use cases. We further show that hallucinations often accumulate over long contexts, through self-reinforcing dialogue history, and models are particularly vulnerable to questions requiring premise rejection or refusal. Together, these findings highlight CEDI as a step toward realistic, systematic, and ecologically valid assessments of MLLMs' capabilities. Code is available at this http URL.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.14499
The interconnected nature of global financial systems makes them vulnerable to systemic risks, where the failure of a few institutions can trigger catastrophic cascading defaults. Traditional risk models often fail to capture the complex, non-linear dynamics of these networks. While Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have shown promise in modeling relational data, they primarily learn correlative patterns and function as black boxes, offering little insight into the causal mechanisms of shock propagation. This limitation is critical for regulators who require explainable models to perform stress tests and devise effective interventions. We introduce CausalGraphX, a novel framework that integrates GNNs with counterfactual reasoning to provide explainable assessments of systemic risk. CausalGraphX employs a Graph Attention mechanism to learn representations of institutional vulnerability and uses an adversarial regularization technique to ensure these representations capture causal drivers rather than spurious correlations. Furthermore, we propose an optimization-based approach to generate counterfactual explanations, answering questions such as, "What minimum capital injection would have prevented Bank A's default under a specific stress scenario?" We validate CausalGraphX on large-scale synthetic financial networks. Our results demonstrate that CausalGraphX significantly outperforms traditional and deep learning baselines in predicting cascading defaults while providing sparse, plausible, and actionable counterfactual explanations.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.14416
Feature-attribution methods are central to explainable artificial intelligence. Their assumptions are expressed in several mathematical languages: cooperative-game values, path integrals, gradient operators, perturbation distributions, and backpropagation rules. This survey proposes a common framework for local additive feature attribution. It organizes Shapley, path-based, gradient/backpropagation, perturbation, and CAM-style methods around five specification choices: value function, reference, path, perturbation distribution, and conservation rule. It then compares these methods through an axiom-by-method matrix and links common failure modes, including baseline sensitivity, off-manifold perturbations, sanity-check failures, adversarial manipulation, and method disagreement, to the assumptions that produce them. Finally, the survey proposes a ten-item reporting checklist for studies that use local additive attributions. The central message is that attribution results are meaningful only relative to the mathematical assumptions under which they are defined, and that those assumptions should be reported.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.14271
Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are increasingly deployed for nuanced content safety and moderation tasks, yet they remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks and out-of-distribution edge cases. Traditional active learning and manual annotation fail to scale against the complexity and volume of novel multimodal threats. In this paper, we propose an automated, agentic red-teaming framework that systematically synthesizes difficult examples using an iterative strategy that proposes novel hypotheses as well as mutating on past attempts. Leveraging a multi-agent architecture that consists of a high-reasoning Architect agent, an advanced image generator, and a multi-level verification committee of LLM raters, our system autonomously uncovers boundary-pushing violations and ambiguous policy edge cases without any human intervention. By employing these carefully synthesized adversarial examples as in-context demonstrations via test-time Retrieval, we substantially improve the target model's robustness, reducing the False Negative Rate (FNR) from 41.2% to 24.5% in a public image safety benchmark without relying on any human labeling.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.14256
Penetration testing traditionally evaluates whether adversaries can exploit weaknesses in software, infrastructure, configurations, or operational controls to achieve security-relevant compromise. This paradigm remains necessary for AI-enabled systems, but it is no longer sufficient. In such systems, adversaries may influence prompts, retrieved content, sensor inputs, training data, memory, tools, or human-AI interaction loops to alter system behavior without directly compromising the underlying infrastructure. This paper reframes penetration testing for AI-enabled systems as objective-driven behavioral evaluation. We define an AI-enabled system as one in which learned models materially influence behavior affecting operational outcomes, and we define AI-enabled penetration as the feasible induction of AI-governed behavior that violates one or more operational objectives under an explicit threat model. This definition preserves conventional penetration testing while extending it to adversarial pathways such as prompt injection, indirect prompt injection, data poisoning, sensor manipulation, retrieval poisoning, tool misuse, and agentic misalignment. We further propose a testing workflow that identifies operational objectives, maps AI-governed behavior, analyzes adversarial influence surfaces, defines behavioral failure criteria, executes scenario-based tests, and reports evidence linking adversarial action to objective violation. A running example involving an AI-enabled security operations center assistant illustrates how penetration may occur through behavioral influence rather than infrastructure compromise. Together, the definitions, workflow, and example provide a technical framework for evaluating adversarial success in deployed AI-enabled systems.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.14006
Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) algorithms are powerful tools for learning from and generalizing expert demonstrations, but they often rely on unconstrained exploration, rendering them unsafe for real-world deployment. Meanwhile, Control Barrier Functions (CBFs) can guarantee the safety of control systems, but the analytical design of CBFs can be time-consuming and esoteric. In this work, we address these limitations jointly by constraining reward function candidacy during IRL to the space of CBFs, yielding a formulation that exhibits safe online control with continuous experiential improvement. Crucially, this framework enables the data-driven recovery of barrier functions directly from unlabeled expert observations. We demonstrate that the recovered barrier function is robust to unsafe states entirely absent from the expert data. Furthermore, we benchmark our method against standard IRL baselines in a simulated navigation environment, demonstrating improved safety performance. Finally, we investigate the trade-offs of planning-based versus policy-based IRL methods across both simulation and a real world obstacle avoidance task.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.13938