ML code should run where researchers choose, not where it was first written. Today, machine learning code mainly lives in two ecosystems, PyTorch on NVIDIA GPUs and JAX on Google TPUs. Migrating repositories between them means building and testing across frameworks and hardware. This migration is (1) a practical need, since it unlocks different hardware for researchers, and (2) a natural benchmark: it involves different frameworks and hardware, covers whole repositories, and is long-horizon and challenging. We introduce XStack, a benchmark that evaluates agents on migrating ML repositories between these two ecosystems. Each agent receives a PyTorch repository and a clean TPU machine and must deliver a JAX repository. Its output passes if it meets our grading criteria, based on the source repository's published result, authenticated and calibrated by us. Migration by agents remains unreliable: Claude Opus 5 passes 75%, GPT-5.6-sol 45%, and every other agent at most 40%. XStack is a step toward freeing ML code from its ecosystem. We release XStack to make progress toward reliable migration across frameworks and hardware measurable.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.08472
LLM-based medical assistants that follow a patient across visits need a memory that keeps the patient's clinical state correct as it changes. We examine the errors of five memory systems on longitudinal medical dialogue and find three recurring causes: the retrieved evidence gives an outdated state, includes another person's health facts, or lacks a safety fact the answer depends on. We present MedGraph, a graph memory built for these three cases. Construction extracts dated facts from each session, attributes each fact to the person it describes, and links medication, diagnosis, and measurement records into chains that keep earlier states. Retrieval ranks the patient's chains as units, reads each chain at the time the question asks about, and adds the original dialogue text; a patient profile lists every recorded safety fact with every question. On MedMemoryBench, MedGraph has the highest overall accuracy with both a GPT and a Qwen backbone, 10.5 and 10.4 points above the strongest of five baselines, with efficient memory construction and answering in the GPT setting.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.08433
Chat remains the default surface for many large language model (LLM) tasks, even as agentic tools such as OpenCode excel at coding and automation. Yet the model sees the current dialogue but not the workspace around it. We explore meta access---giving the assistant a structured, permissioned view of the interface itself and propose a ladder of levels: feature tutoring; metadata, settings, and preference access; retrieval over summaries and messages, confirmed mutation, and full orchestration. Meta access can turn a chat client from many screens into one entry point for finding, navigating, organising, and operating it, while raising risks around grounding, privacy, prompt injection, and trust. General-purpose agentic harnesses are runtimes; because they can change their own settings, meta access becomes reflexive and needs a separate control-plane boundary. We ground this in the Meta Chat prototype of the Chat AI client. It builds bounded context from, e.g., summaries, settings, and relevant messages; links references to conversations, topics, and personas; supports confirmed, reversible changes; offers a browsable tutorial library; and recommends personas as user-started conversations. By exposing application state in structured form, meta access can extend screen readers from widget descriptions to semantic workspace operations. Meta access thus turns chat from a window onto one conversation into a control layer for the whole workspace, extending chat toward agentic capability without surrendering user control. As assistants become embedded in IDEs, dashboards, office suites, and operating systems, AI-era interfaces should expose a structured, permissioned model of their state and capabilities, ideally by opening their existing metamodels through a debugger-like interface.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.08428
Coding agents are among the most economically consequential deployments of LLMs to date, making reliable evaluation increasingly important. Yet even benchmarks that are carefully validated at release can become stale. As models improve, they can discover valid solutions that existing verifiers reject, while changes to evaluation infrastructure can invalidate assumptions embedded in tasks and tests. We call the resulting accumulation of defects benchmark maintenance debt: a growing gap between benchmark scores and the capabilities they are intended to measure. We introduce a continuous-validation workflow for agentic benchmarks that combines community reports, task artifacts, agent traces, automated oracle checks, and human-gated repairs. We apply this workflow to Terminal-Bench 2.0, a benchmark that underwent extensive human and LM-assisted review and red-teaming before release. Our audit identifies issues in roughly 30% of the benchmark, and we release the resulting repairs as Terminal-Bench 2.1. These repairs change evaluation results: accuracy increased by over 10 percentage points and leaderboard positions move by up to three ranks, even as the overall ranking remains highly correlated (Spearman rho = 0.958). We evaluate how resource allocation shapes benchmark conclusions. We show that fixed wall-clock can materially change agent performance: For example, extending the time limit closes a 20pp harness gap on GPT 5.4 and shrinks a 30 pp gap on GPT 5.4 mini to 5 pp. Benchmark maintenance is therefore not only about repairing task artifacts: resource budgets are part of the measurement specification and must be validated alongside the tasks themselves. More broadly, benchmark maintenance debt is not just accumulated implementation bugs: our results show that as models improve, both evaluation assumptions and resource settings may need to be revalidated.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.08417
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in biomedical and cognitive neuroscience, but their ability to reason reliably over heterogeneous knowledge graphs (KGs) remains unclear. We benchmark five LLMs (GPT-5.1, Gemini 2.0 Pro, Llama 3, Qwen, and BioGPT) across five KGs: DrugBank, NeuroSynth, Cognitive Atlas, Brain Map, and GDPKG. We introduce a multitier query dataset to evaluate reasoning depth and factual accuracy under KG-aware (graph-grounded) and KG-agnostic conditions. Inter-annotator agreement was substantial, with Cohen's kappa of 0.781 (range: 0.753-0.807) and Fleiss' kappa of 0.77. Results show that general-purpose models, particularly GPT-5.1 and Gemini 2.0 Pro, generally outperform domain-specific models on multi-hop and high-level reasoning tasks, although performance declines as query complexity increases. KG grounding reduces hallucination rates across all evaluated models. Contrary to our initial hypothesis, domain-specific models do not consistently outperform general-purpose models on specialized tasks without graph grounding. These findings highlight the value of combining broad language-model capabilities with structured domain knowledge. We provide practical guidance for selecting LLM-KG integration strategies based on task complexity and computational constraints, and discuss hybrid neurosymbolic architectures for personalized medicine, cognitive disorder diagnosis, and explainable AI.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.08315
Personal AI agents face social engineering attacks supported by forged multimodal content, but existing evaluations mainly focus on text-based dialogue, leaving their intrinsic security under such attacks insufficiently studied. We introduce Multimodal-SEA, an interactive benchmark comprising 608 expert-designed tasks grounded in real-world fraud cases, covering 14 domains and 152 attack scenarios with prepared multimodal content. The tasks span four difficulty levels and reflect the distinct social and cultural contexts of Chinese and English environments. Agents inspect content, verify requests, and execute actions in simulated applications, with attack outcomes grounded in verifiable tool execution logs. To enable controlled red teaming of personal agents, we design a multimodal attack harness that integrates task information, attack progression control, and multimodal content construction to evaluate their intrinsic security against adaptive social engineering attacks in simulated environments. Evaluating seven widely used multimodal models across six dimensions reveals that all are vulnerable, with attack success rates of 7.1% to 34.5%. Adding multimodal content increases attack success from 19.9% to 29.2%, despite increased proactive verification coverage. Stronger safety instructions reduce attack success without improving recognition of deceptive multimodal content, while lower attack success rates for some models accompany excessive refusal of legitimate requests.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.08281
After a runtime or API migration, an LLM-repaired procedure can run cleanly yet return wrong results, and a release check on typical test inputs ships it. We report a preregistered study of 73 tasks covering 60 documented changes in CPython, this http URL and SQLite. Every candidate is executed on the real runtimes against withheld contracts. Over the complete repair space, the all-assertions gate on typical inputs released 0.410 of wrong repairs. One edge input written from the release note cut this to 0.065, and to 0.061 on 15 unseen clusters. Three inputs from a blind GPT-5.6-luna writer that never saw the program reached 0.070. Two further frozen stages enlarged the menu to 1491 fragments and then added 233 hard distractors that match the legacy output on typical inputs. The edge input (0.058) and the frontier-model writer (0.058) passed their preregistered tests. Yet 0.168 and 0.153 of the hard wrong programs still passed. Two local-model writers failed their preregistered tests. Across four model families, the edge input cut wrong releases per attempt in all three open-weight families on all three menus, for example from 0.233 to 0.057, without lowering correct completion. Self-tests helped less. A blind AI audit flagged 34 contracts as stricter than their requirements. Dropping the disputed checks changed 0 verdicts, but class-label disputes remain open. No model-written code was executed. Artifacts are available from the authors on request.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.08269
Large language models (LLMs) often present synthesized answers without making their supporting evidence easy to inspect. We study how features of these answers relate to users' subsequent accepting, checking, and challenging in 489,283 assistant-user response pairs from ShareChat and WildChat. Broad attribution language appears in 31.9% of qualifying responses, compared with explicit URLs in 1.33%, revealing a gap between claims of grounding and preserved inspectable support. Attribution, uncertainty, and other response cues generally accompany both checking and challenging; only uncertainty shows a small statistically distinguishable pooled association favoring checking. Within Technical Help, uncertainty favors checking relative to challenging; refusals and reasoning traces favor challenging in Seeking Information. Scrutiny is concentrated in some conversations, while its apparent turn-to-turn persistence becomes much smaller when conversation-level differences and response ordering are examined separately. These results suggest that supporting verification requires attention to what evidence can be inspected, which question a user is trying to resolve, and the history of the interaction.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.08232
This paper presents a novel task of describing human facial expressions of a facial image in natural language, which captures the nuances of facial actions and emotional states beyond traditional emotion categories or facial action units (AUs). To achieve the facial expression captioning model, we propose a three-stage training framework that trains a vision-to-language model using synthesized image-text pairs and the BLIP-2 pre-training techniques. To overcome the challenge of missing training image-text pairs for facial expression captioning, we propose a strategy that involves synthesizing and combining captions using GPT-3.5 and existing annotations on either emotion categories or AUs. Experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our method in generating captions that describe details of facial actions and emotions, as well as the inferential relationship between them, even when those emotions are not present in the training data. It is also demonstrated that the vision-to-language task enhances the performance of the intermediate visual features on both AU detection and emotion classification tasks.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.08138
Diet is a major determinant of health, yet accurate dietary assessment from free-living meal images remains challenging. Existing retrieval-based Vision-Language Model (VLM) approaches to nutrient estimation typically rely on textual food representations, while, to our knowledge, direct grounding on visually similar annotated meals has not been investigated. We present NutriVisRAG, a retrieval-augmented generation framework that uses a vision encoder to retrieve similar meals with known nutritional annotations and provide them as multimodal in-context exemplars for VLM nutrient estimation at inference time, without task-specific fine-tuning. We evaluate NutriVisRAG across four datasets, four VLMs, three retrieval encoders, and two prompting strategies, including free-living meals from adults with insulin-treated diabetes, where carbohydrate estimates are compared against two dietitians' annotations. Across all 96 configurations (4 datasets x 4 VLMs x 3 retrieval encoders x 2 prompting strategies), NutriVisRAG reduced the primary estimation error in 56, with improvements more frequent under whole-meal (35/48) than per-item prompting (21/48). Across the evaluated configurations, the lowest NutriVisRAG error was below the best Vanilla error in 13 of 16 VLM--dataset pairs. For GPT-5.4-mini, under whole-meal prompting, the best-performing retrieval encoder for each dataset reduced the primary error on all four datasets relative to Vanilla, with reductions of 1.7--35.7%. Overall, our results show that grounding in multimodal exemplars comprising images and respective annotations can improve nutrient estimation at inference time without task-specific fine-tuning, although the benefits remain configuration-dependent.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.08054
Can large language models (LLMs) advance theoretical computer science and resolve its long-standing open conjectures? To study progress toward this goal, we introduce TCSExam, a unified framework and benchmark covering the full range of TCS research. It evaluates theorem proving, solver engineering, and constructions alongside direct attempts to resolve open conjectures, capturing both concrete research accomplishments and progress toward long-standing research goals. TCSExam-Full contains 100 expert-reviewed tasks, with submissions checked by the Lean kernel or an executable task checker. TCSExam-Lite selects 20 tasks, five per track, reducing the number of task attempts by 80% at the same per-attempt budget. We evaluate eight agents on Full and nine on Lite. The TCSExam Index combines all four tracks: GPT-6 Astra leads Full (71.9), and Opus 5.5 leads Lite (72.3). Full and Lite rankings are strongly aligned across eight shared agents (Spearman's $\rho=0.93$), supporting Lite as a compact, discriminative benchmark. The evaluations yield improved solver outputs and mathematical constructions, together with independently verified special cases and bounds from open-conjecture attempts. TCSExam provides an extensible framework with task sources, Docker build recipes, and evaluation tools for reproducible use.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07962
Autoregressive approaches with large language models, such as long chain-of-thought reasoning, have become the default for new AI applications because they reach higher accuracy on a wide range of tasks. In production, however, they give inconsistent answers, require parsing of outputs, and add cost and latency. Decision models address this: given a question and a set of options supplied by the user, they return a probability distribution over the options without autoregressive decoding. We present Drex, a family of four open decision models with 8B (DLM), 9B (v1.5), 35B with 3B active (v2.0), and 27B (Max) parameters. Each request consists of a state (a document, record, or agent context, optionally with images) and questions about it, each asking for a choice among options, a yes/no judgment, or a score on an ordered scale. Training combines supervised fine-tuning with reinforcement learning from adjusted feedback (RLAF), plus vision tuning for Max. Ablations show that RLAF improves accuracy and that consistency losses improve robustness to option order. On Decision Index 0.4.1, Max sets a new state of the art among the decision models we compare (67.52 on the public suite vs. 60.70 for Jev 1.14.0). On Decision Bench v4, it is statistically tied with d3-turbo and GPT-6 Sol and trails Claude Opus 5.5 by 1.6 points, and it has the highest accuracy among decision models on DecideBench. Max answers a typical request in 183 ms, against about 2.0 s for GPT-6 Sol and 3.5 s for Claude Opus 5.5, and its outputs are stable under option reordering. All four models are open source: this https URL
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07854
Frontier large language models (LLMs) have been reported to read, edit and write the weights of small neural networks, raising the prospect of auditing clinical prediction models from their files alone. Public demonstrations, however, mixed reading raw weights with running code. We separated these conditions in internally pre-specified simulation experiments. Tanh networks of 105 to 38,401 weights were trained on simulated cohorts of patients with subarachnoid haemorrhage, each with a planted relationship or none, and one network was trained on labels that under-recorded deaths in a subgroup. GPT-6 Astra and four other GPT models answered single prompts under a default or an explicit system instruction, either with the weights in the prompt and no tools, or with a calculation-only tool that exposed the weights (white box) or only the network's predictions (black box). Without tools, Astra recovered planted relationships in 353-weight networks but became unreliable at 3,457 weights, and under the default instruction it declined 11 of 12 audit and repair tasks as unidentifiable; the explicit instruction removed these refusals. With the tool, it recovered the planted relationship in all 29 runs on networks of up to 38,401 weights, raised no false alarm in 15 runs on null networks, and found the biased subgroup in 6 of 6 runs. Black-box access performed as well as white-box access, and other GPT-6 models read as accurately. A well-designed script matched the comparator models on the audit and the best LLM repair. For auditing these networks, what mattered was computation and elicitation, not access to the weights.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07847
Goal interpretation is to translate a natural language instruction into a formal symbolic goal that a planner can execute. It is critical for embodied agents because any error here propagates to every downstream planning and action step. Doing it well requires both generating suitable candidates and reliably selecting among them. We present a two-stage generate-then-rank approach to Goal Interpretation in the Embodied Agent Interface (EAI). First, supervised fine-tuning adapts a Large Language Model (LLM) to EAI's output convention. Second, Candidate-Output Ranking from Errors (CORE) learns preferences over complete outputs from the model's own generated alternatives. We conducted experiments on the household scenes of the Embodied Agent Interface Benchmark. Multiple open source LLMs including DeepSeek-V3 chat, DeepSeek-Reasoner, and Qwen2.5-7B and Qwen2.5-72B were evaluated. The proposed method outperformed the baseline models including LLMs with simple prompting, chain-of-thought, and knowledge graph based approaches.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07825
Users of egocentric AI assistants often ask short, ambiguous questions whose intended referents cannot be uniquely resolved from video and dialogue history. For example, "Where did I leave it?" may refer to several previously handled objects. Existing VideoQA systems typically commit to a single interpretation, risking plausible but intention-misaligned answers. We introduce ReferClaw, an agentic framework that formulates egocentric streaming QA as an interactive process: the assistant asks clarifying questions to resolve user intent before answering. Three cooperating agents identify candidate interpretations, request clarification, and generate answers grounded in the resolved intent and visual evidence. A bounded, cost-aware policy balances expected information gain against user effort while limiting clarification turns and question complexity. Referclaw learns from interaction through intent-specific skill updates and process-reward-guided policy optimization with agent-level credit assignment. Evaluations on augmented egocentric QA benchmarks demonstrate improved answer accuracy and joint answer-and-grounding performance over existing baselines, alongside zero-shot transfer across datasets. These findings support interactive clarification as a practical approach to resolving online user intent in egocentric streaming assistance.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07683
The performance of multi-agent LLM systems depends not only on the capabilities of the underlying models but also on information-sharing policies, which govern what information each agent observes and at what level of detail. But does providing AI agents with more detailed information always improve collective outcomes, or can transparency paradoxically degrade efficiency? To investigate this, we introduce empirical information design, an experimental framework that systematically compares disclosure policies across economic markets populated by LLM agents, while holding interaction rules and models fixed. We evaluate ten frontier LLMs in multi-resource trade, bilateral bargaining, and double auctions, using ground-truth utilities to decouple identified opportunities from realized outcomes. We find that finer information disclosure yields highly model-dependent results. In trade, revealing exact valuations rather than ordinal preference rankings reduces realized gains for GPT-6 Sol (from 98% to 91% of maximum) yet increases them for Claude Sonnet 5 (from 72% to 86%). In bargaining, exact information leads Grok 4.7 to produce less balanced agreements, whereas Claude Opus 5.5 divides gains symmetrically. In double auctions, full disclosure inflates price demands, triggering market breakdown and lowering welfare for Gemini 3.1 Pro (97% to 78%), Claude Opus 5.5 (94% to 64%), and Grok 4.7 (97% to 62%). Overall, these results suggest that model selection and information design must be co-optimized, as LLMs vary in how their strategic responses to information impact system objectives.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07667
Third-party application programming interface (API) relays offer access to large language models (LLMs), often at lower prices. Users depend on these services for model quality, instruction compliance, and accurate billing. However, existing studies leave unclear whether relays meet these expectations together. We test 20 relays offering GPT-6 Astra and Claude Opus 5. First, we compare answers to knowledge questions with batch-matched official responses. In our first-round sample, the analysis flags 7/10 low-price and 2/10 same- or higher-price relays for behavioral differences. On retesting 35 pairs, seven gain or lose a flag under the original rules, and six under matched correction families. Because answer comparisons cannot reveal every delivery problem, we examine returned content and tool permissions. No injection is confirmed in 3,332 screened responses to a fixed, non-adversarial code and setup workload, yet four relays return tool calls despite instructions disabling them in the first round. Finally, to connect reported usage to actual costs, we compare input-token counts with official references and check balances. For identical requests, five relays report 4,200 to 60,000 more input tokens than the official API. Where balances are available (six services), charges follow reported usage at listed prices, including extra reported input tokens at one service. Our study shows that advertised models and prices are insufficient to judge relay reliability. It identifies unexplained billed token quantities and tool-permission violations as risks and shows why service evaluations need repeated measurements.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07650
As LLM agents advance rapidly in autonomy, the risk of hidden objectives that bypass safety constraints becomes increasingly plausible. Chain-of-thought (CoT) monitoring offers a key control mechanism by reading the agent's reasoning and flagging misalignment before it materializes into action, yet its reliability depends on the realism of the red-team it is stress-tested against. Existing red-teaming efforts rely on shared templates, such as casting a side task as a prerequisite, which treat the side objective as an exogenous insertion and leave task-specific, contextually grounded evasions underexplored. We therefore ask: How robust is CoT monitoring against agents that strategically conceal misalignment? To answer this, we introduce TraceMRT, an automated Trace-level Monitor Red-Teaming framework that reframes the side task as a coherent sub-goal of the primary task and searches trace-shaping strategies whose induced trajectories complete the misaligned objective while reading as natural execution. Through black-box attacks on state-of-the-art monitors such as GPT-5.2 and Claude-4.5, we reveal substantial vulnerabilities even in top models. To counter these vulnerabilities, we propose a Bayesian Trajectory Monitoring framework, integrating global context and local segment evidence to detect covert misalignment. Empirically, our method significantly consolidates monitor robustness with 0.91 AUC and 0.74 TPR@FPR=0.05.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07586
Language agents increasingly use persistent memory to record user preferences and procedures across sessions. We show that memory from benign interactions can cause unsafe or unreliable behavior on later tasks. We call this failure the memory trap. To study this issue, we compare behavior in sessions with and without memory across six frontier models (including Claude Sonnet, Opus, and Fable models and GPT-5.6). We evaluate these models in a range of settings. First, in autonomy experiments, we find that requests to skip confirmation during low-stakes coding chores lead agents to skip confirmation and verification on simulated high-stakes tasks in both coding and everyday life. We next study memories formed when users seek emotional support, or describe harm from uncritical feedback, and find these memories bias later judgments of mathematical work, arguments, and poems toward sycophancy or over-critique (respectively). Memory notes written during legitimate stale-test repairs lead agents to weaken correct tests that catch broken safeguards; these memories also increase cheating on ImpossibleBench, with larger increases for stronger Sonnet and Opus models. We show that memory traps can arise both from overgeneralizations in memory writing, and when acting on memory. These findings demonstrate that even benign interactions can lead to serious risks from memory systems, and thus motivate the need for new research into ensuring that agents preserve the scope of their memories.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07554
Enterprise AI agents increasingly split a user's request across subagents and merge their results, and each handoff can summarize away, alter or ignore a requirement. We report a preregistered study with synthetic, exactly scorable tasks comparing free-text, structured JSON and signed requirement-manifest handoffs: the orchestrator extracts each requirement as a verbatim quote plus a checkable predicate, code signs the manifest with HMAC-SHA256, and deterministic code verifies the merger's decision. With Qwen3-8B (1,440 trajectories, five threats), signed manifests cut unsafe commits under attack from 69.4% to 9.0% (60.4 pp, 95% CI [51.4, 69.4]) with no net loss of conformant commits relative to structured handoffs. Signing is what defeats in-transit tampering: an unsigned manifest committed violations in 79% of mutated runs, the signed one in none. On identical trajectories the deterministic verifier caught 78.7% of violating decisions versus 59.0% for an LLM checker, with 7% versus 50% false alarms. An oracle manifest removed all remaining unsafe commits: the residual risk comes from extraction errors made before signing. A preregistered pre-signing injection attack confirmed this boundary: one adversarial line raised signed-manifest violations from 14.6% to 37.5% (Qwen3-8B), 11.1% to 63.9% (gpt-oss-20b) and 8.3% to 75.0% (GPT-5.6-luna), and the signature then authenticated the corrupted manifest. Signing protects requirements in transit, not at extraction; the extraction step is the trust boundary.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07483