Abstract
Safety critical systems are typically subjected to hazard analysis before commissioning to identify and analyse potentially hazardous system states that may arise during operation. Currently, hazard analysis is mainly based on human reasoning, past experiences, and simple tools such as checklists and spreadsheets. Increasing system complexity makes such approaches decreasingly suitable. Furthermore, testing-based hazard analysis is often not suitable due to high costs or dangers of physical faults. A remedy for this are model-based hazard analysis methods, which either rely on formal models or on simulation models, each with their own benefits and drawbacks. This paper proposes a two-layer approach that combines the benefits of exhaustive analysis using formal methods with detailed analysis using simulation. Unsafe behaviours that lead to unsafe states are first synthesised from a formal model of the system using Supervisory Control Theory. The result is then input to the simulation where detailed analyses using domain-specific risk metrics are performed. Though the presented approach is generally applicable, this paper demonstrates the benefits of the approach on an industrial human-robot collaboration system.
Abstract (translated)
URL
https://arxiv.org/abs/2209.12560
