Abstract
In many applications, ads are displayed together with the prices, so as to provide a direct comparison among similar products or services. The price-displaying feature not only influences the consumers' decisions, but also affects the advertisers' bidding behaviors. In this paper, we study ad auctions with display prices from the perspective of mechanism design, in which advertisers are asked to submit both the costs and prices of their products. We provide a characterization for all incentive compatible auctions with display prices, and use it to design auctions under two scenarios. In the former scenario, the display prices are assumed to be exogenously determined. For this setting, we derive the welfare-maximizing and revenue-maximizing auctions for any realization of the price profile. In the latter, advertisers are allowed to strategize display prices in their own interests. We investigate two families of allocation policies within the scenario and identify the equilibrium prices accordingly. Our results reveal that the display prices do affect the design of ad auctions and the platform can leverage such information to optimize the performance of ad delivery.
Abstract (translated)
在许多应用程序中，广告和价格一起显示，以便提供类似产品或服务之间的直接比较。显示价格 feature 不仅会影响消费者的决策，还会影响广告商的竞标行为。在本文中，我们从机制设计的角度研究带有显示价格的 ads 拍卖，要求广告商提交其产品的成本和价值。我们提供了与显示价格相关的特征描述，并使用它设计了两个场景下的拍卖。在第一个场景中，显示价格假设是外部决定的。为此，我们推导出任何价格型实现的最佳福利和收入最大化拍卖。在第二个场景中，广告商被允许为自己的私利制定显示价格策略。我们研究了场景内的两个分配政策家族，并相应地确定均衡价格。我们的结果表明，显示价格确实会影响 ads 拍卖的设计，平台可以利用这些信息优化广告交付的性能。
URL
https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.13192
