Abstract
Repeated game has long been the touchstone model for agents' long-run relationships. Previous results suggest that it is particularly difficult for a repeated game player to exert an autocratic control on the payoffs since they are jointly determined by all participants. This work discovers that the scale of a player's capability to unilaterally influence the payoffs may have been much underestimated. Under the conventional iterated prisoner's dilemma, we develop a general framework for controlling the feasible region where the players' payoff pairs lie. A control strategy player is able to confine the payoff pairs in her objective region, as long as this region has feasible linear boundaries. With this framework, many well-known existing strategies can be categorized and various new strategies with nice properties can be further identified. We show that the control strategies perform well either in a tournament or against a human-like opponent.
Abstract (translated)
重复游戏一直是代理商长期关系的试金石模型。之前的结果表明，重复的游戏玩家特别难以对收益进行专制控制，因为它们是由所有参与者共同决定的。这项工作发现，玩家单方面影响收益的能力可能被低估了。在传统的迭代囚徒困境下，我们开发了一个控制球员收益对的可行区域的总体框架。只要该区域具有可行的线性边界，控制策略播放器就能够将支付对限制在其目标区域中。通过该框架，可以对许多众所周知的现有策略进行分类，并且可以进一步识别具有良好属性的各种新策略。我们表明，控制策略在锦标赛中或在类似人类的对手中表现良好。
URL
https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.06666
