Abstract
This paper provides the first formalisation and empirical demonstration of a particular safety concern in reinforcement learning (RL)-based news and social media recommendation algorithms. This safety concern is what we call "user tampering" -- a phenomenon whereby an RL-based recommender system may manipulate a media user's opinions, preferences and beliefs via its recommendations as part of a policy to increase long-term user engagement. We provide a simulation study of a media recommendation problem constrained to the recommendation of political content, and demonstrate that a Q-learning algorithm consistently learns to exploit its opportunities to 'polarise' simulated 'users' with its early recommendations in order to have more consistent success with later recommendations catering to that polarisation. Finally, we argue that given our findings, designing an RL-based recommender system which cannot learn to exploit user tampering requires making the metric for the recommender's success independent of observable signals of user engagement, and thus that a media recommendation system built solely with RL is necessarily either unsafe, or almost certainly commercially unviable.
Abstract (translated)
URL
https://arxiv.org/abs/2109.04083
