Abstract
The Internet of Vehicles (IoV), whereby interconnected vehicles communicate with each other and with road infrastructure on a common network, has promising socio-economic benefits but also poses new cyber-physical threats. Data on vehicular attackers can be realistically gathered through cyber threat intelligence using systems like honeypots. Admittedly, configuring honeypots introduces a trade-off between the level of honeypot-attacker interactions and any incurred overheads and costs for implementing and monitoring these honeypots. We argue that effective deception can be achieved through strategically configuring the honeypots to represent components of the IoV and engage attackers to collect cyber threat intelligence. In this paper, we present HoneyCar, a novel decision support framework for honeypot deception in IoV. HoneyCar builds upon a repository of known vulnerabilities of the autonomous and connected vehicles found in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposure (CVE) data within the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) to compute optimal honeypot configuration strategies. By taking a game-theoretic approach, we model the adversarial interaction as a repeated imperfect-information zero-sum game in which the IoV network administrator chooses a set of vulnerabilities to offer in a honeypot and a strategic attacker chooses a vulnerability of the IoV to exploit under uncertainty. Our investigation is substantiated by examining two different versions of the game, with and without the re-configuration cost to empower the network administrator to determine optimal honeypot configurations. We evaluate HoneyCar in a realistic use case to support decision makers with determining optimal honeypot configuration strategies for strategic deployment in IoV.
Abstract (translated)
URL
https://arxiv.org/abs/2111.02364
