LLM systems increasingly rely on groups of agents that discuss, critique, and check one another, assuming that peers will catch individual errors. We test this assumption against a minimal adversary. In a ten-agent factual discussion, one or three adversarial agents repeatedly assert a plausible false answer. After each round we probe each benign agent's private answer through a separate call whose response is hidden from its peers, and we separately label its public stance toward the claim. Across six models and three factual-QA datasets, groups remain stable without an attacker: only 0.6% of benign agents finish with the false answer. A single adversarial agent increases this rate to 44.8% and three to 60.5%. Studies of conformity typically report public agreement without private change; we find the reverse. With three adversarial agents present, benign agents hold the false answer in 51.6% of exposed turns but publicly endorse it in only 19.7%. Much of the influence therefore remains invisible in the discussion, and the false answers persist when agents are asked for their own views. Agents that retain the true answer often fail to defend it; once adopted, the false answer spreads among benign agents, and baseline knowledge does not predict robustness.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.22138
Recursive Self-Improvement (RSI) has gained wide attention for its ability to work with limited data. In a proposer-solver loop, a proposer model writes training tasks and a solver model learns to solve them through reinforcement learning. Such loops have succeeded in mathematics and coding, where every answer can be checked automatically. Open-ended expert tasks, like clinical report generations, have no answer key, which makes simple question-answer generation not viable. Here the proposer must also write a rubric that lists the content an answer should include and the errors it should avoid. However, the unique challenge behind model-written rubric is the comprehensiveness of it. For naively generated rubric, solvers tend to exploit it, naming the expected topics without the substance behind them, which corrupts the learning process. To solve this problem, we introduce RRI, Recursive Reward Improvement, which uses a reward hacking adversary to supervise the reward. Before the solver trains on a generated task, an adversary writes an answer that games its rubric while being as useless as possible, the same model writes an honest answer without seeing the rubric, and up to two repair steps revise the rubric to make the honest answer win. The exploits found also rewrite how future tasks and rubrics are generated. On HealthBench Professional, RRI improves the adjusted score over the Generation Only self-improvement baseline by 10.9 points at 9B and 12.4 at 27B, and by 10.3 points without any external model. In particular, the gains are largest on difficult and writing tasks. We show that the 27B model trained on the HealthBench Professional description improves by 6.6 points on PRBench Hard and 8.0 on ProfBench without seeing a task from either. We further analyze the exploitable points of model-generated question-rubric pairs to facilitate future research on open-ended self-play.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.21040
We present Screwtape, a pipeline that converts real agent transcripts into attacks that evade action-only monitors. An LLM attacker edits a transcript so that the agent causes a specified harm, such as leaking an API key or spawning an unmonitored agent. The edited actions are never executed, so we use an LLM verifier to reject attacks that are inconsistent with the original transcript or below a severity bar. The attacker revises the edit until the monitor no longer flags it. We applied Screwtape to 94 Claude Code and Codex transcripts from Redwood Research staff, optimizing against our own monitors. Across 252 runs, it produced 35 attacks that passed the verifier and evaded these monitors. Six of them, confirmed valid by human review, also evaded a held-out monitor provided by a frontier developer. We therefore demonstrate that a red-teamer without access to a developer's infrastructure can find confirmed failures of the developer's monitor. We expect to find more attacks when the pipeline runs inside the developer's infrastructure, with frontier attacker models that lack refusal safeguards and direct optimization against the production monitor. Developers can use these attacks to fix monitor blind spots, and evaluators can use them as counterexamples to safety claims about the monitor.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.20941
LLM-based agents increasingly execute long-horizon, end-to-end workflows involving shell commands, code modification, dependency installation, and interaction with remote services. This growing autonomy expands their exposure to indirect prompt injection (IPI), where adversarial instructions embedded in external content are interpreted as legitimate task directives. Existing evaluations, however, often focus on isolated malicious strings, single-step tool calls, or narrowly scoped agent configurations. We introduce INFUSE, an end-to-end benchmark for evaluating IPI throughout the lifecycle of long-horizon agent workflows. INFUSE comprises 40 realistic tasks and a structured taxonomy of 56 attack scenarios spanning five threat categories. Attacks are injected through realistic interaction surfaces encountered during task execution, extending evaluation beyond attacks placed only in initial prompts or isolated tool interactions. We evaluate 19 LLMs from the GPT, Claude, Gemini, Llama, Gemma, and Qwen families, producing 41,824 adversarial trajectories (26,220 without defenses) and 720 benign reference runs. Across the benchmark, mean attack success reaches 19.6% under LLM-based evaluation and 15.4% under heuristic verification, with per-model ASR-L ranging from 3.2% to 41.9%. Existing guard models provide limited protection, while prompt-level instructional hardening reduces mean attack success from 58.2% to 14.3%, revealing substantial but model-dependent security-utility trade-offs. Our code is available at this https URL.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.20776
Mechanistic interpretability aims to uncover how neural networks use their parameters to implement their impressive neural algorithms. Although previous work has uncovered substantial structure in the intermediate representations that networks use, little progress has been made to understand how the parameters and nonlinearities of networks perform computations on those representations. In this work, we present a method that brings us closer to this understanding by decomposing a language model's parameters into subcomponents that each implement only a small part of the model's learned algorithm, while simultaneously requiring only a small fraction of those subcomponents to account for the network's behavior on any input. The method, adVersarial Parameter Decomposition (VPD), optimizes for decompositions of neural network parameters into simple subcomponents that preserve the network's input-output behavior even when many subcomponents are ablated, including under ablations that are adversarially selected to destroy behavior. This encourages learning subcomponents that provide short, mechanistically faithful descriptions of the network's behavior that should aggregate appropriately into more global descriptions of the network's learned algorithm. We study how sequences of interactions between these parameter subcomponents produce the network's output on particular inputs, enabling a new kind of 'circuit' analysis. While more work remains to be done to deepen our understanding of how neural networks use their parameters to compute their behavior, our work suggests an approach to identify a small set of simple, mechanistically faithful subcomponents on which further mechanistic analysis can be based.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.20748
Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models are gaining attention in autonomous driving, inheriting commonsense priors from large language models (LLMs) and widening the navigation interface from a fixed command set to free-form natural-language instructions. However, this open-ended interface exposes a new vulnerability surface: an inattentive driver may issue instructions that are unsafe given the current scene, and a malicious user may issue dangerous ones on purpose. We present the first benchmark suite that evaluates navigation following and conflict awareness together, along with adversarial robustness. Existing VLAs fall short on both: SimLingo completes no language-instructed lane change in closed loop, and all models degrade sharply under conflicting signals. We propose SafeDriveVLA, the first driving VLA that (1) explicitly predicts a three-level navigation-compliance mode to decouple conflict reasoning from action generation, and (2) uses navigation-conditioned world model dreaming to inform this prediction. Unlike prior world models that roll out expert or planned actions, ours dreams of strictly following the navigation signal, showing when following is safe. SafeDriveVLA reaches 88.16 Driving Score (DS) and 68.64% Success Rate (SR) on Bench2Drive, lifts closed-loop language following by 49.3% and reduces collisions under unsafe instructions from 60 to 38 compared to the best SimLingo variant. Video demonstrations are available on our project page.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.20609
Advances in generative AI have made it possible to produce music that is nearly indistinguishable from human compositions, raising the question of whether such works can be reliably distinguished from human compositions. We present MUSEBENCH, a large-scale benchmark for AI-generated music detection and artifact analysis, comprising over 361K tracks. The dataset includes human compositions, stylistically matched music generated by ten state-of-the-art open-source and commercial models, such as Suno and Udio, as well as human-AI co-creations and variants processed with adversarial perturbations, compression, and acoustic post-processing. Using MUSEBENCH, we benchmark 11 automated detectors and evaluate their accuracy, generalization, and robustness, under default, out-of-domain, and transformed-variant experiment settings. We further conduct a comprehensive artifact analysis through acoustic feature inspection, identifying recurring signatures such as non-idiomatic harmonic progressions, upsampling induced spectral periodicities, and violations of physical performance constraints. Our findings reveal key strengths and vulnerabilities of existing detectors and provide practical insights for building more reliable AI music detection systems.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.20310
Facial image watermarking can support traceability and certification in biometric pipelines, but provenance or manipulation detection alone does not guarantee reliable biometric identity. We introduce a watermark-preserving face evasion attack that targets this gap under a black-box watermarking setting, without access to the watermarking components. The proposed PGD-L_2 attack guides adversarial perturbations with spatial and spectral preservation terms to reduce face-recognition similarity while limiting pixel-level distortion and high-frequency changes that may interfere with hidden watermark cues. Evaluated on controlled facial images with two watermarking schemes, two face-recognition models, and two datasets, the attack achieves evasion rates above 92% at operational thresholds while preserving watermark recovery above 93% for StegaFormer and above 99.7% for FaceSigns, with visual quality above 47dB PSNR at epsilon_2=2.0. These results expose a structural gap in watermark-based facial certification: a face image can remain watermark-valid and visually faithful while becoming biometrically unreliable.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.20278
Speech Emotion Recognition (SER) models and Audio LLMs fail when vocal tone contradicts textual semantics. Extensive training on congruent data engenders a rigid semantic prior, causing "Semantic Dominance", a severe text bias during cross-modal conflicts. We introduce the ASPIRE benchmark of adversarial audio-text pairs across four conflict types, alongside two metrics: Semantic Overconfidence Penalty (SOP) and Latent Decoupling Degree (LDD). Unlike fusion methods that merely re-weight collapsed features, our Acoustic Conflict Resolution Network (ACR-Net) uses Cross-Modal Attention and Contrastive Decoupling Loss to disentangle contradictory representations into orthogonal latent spaces. Experiments show existing models fail under polarity conflicts due to extreme semantic overconfidence. Conversely, ACR-Net preserves acoustic fidelity, maintaining high LDD to drive SOP near zero, achieving superior Acoustic Accuracy (ACC) in both adversarial and standard scenarios.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.20114
Despite significant advances in language understanding, Large Language Models (LLMs) can still miss meaning hidden in plain sight, failing to identify harmful intent in expressions readily understood by humans. Malicious users exploit this gap by strategically disguising harmful content to evade automated moderation, posing a serious threat to online platform safety. The vulnerability reflects a fundamental cognitive asymmetry between human readers, who integrate contextual, phonetic, and visual cues to decipher the intent behind deliberate obfuscation, and text-based LLMs, which rely primarily on token sequences and have limited exposure to evolving evasions. To bridge this asymmetry, we propose PASP (Perception-Aware Adversarial Self-Play), which combines multi-perceptual views with adversarial self-play to improve understanding of harmful intent as evasions evolve. Specifically, PASP constructs textual, phonetic, and visual views of each input, preserving its original context while exposing pronunciation and glyph cues obscured in token space. During adversarial self-play, an attacker uses defender feedback to generate intent-preserving evasions, while the defender is trained using an intent-invariance reward to understand harmful intent across changing surface forms. Extensive experiments show that PASP reduces adaptive attack success rates by up to 73.71% and 74.49% on ChineseHarm-Bench and EvoHarmBench, respectively, preserves model capabilities with minimal degradation, and effectively interprets real-world evasive expressions in e-commerce.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.15449
The rapid advancement of large vision language models (LVLMs) has made geolocation inference from images highly accurate and accessible. This poses serious privacy risks: a passive adversary with black-box LVLM access can infer a user's location from a single photo with no metadata. Existing protection methods rely almost exclusively on adversarial perturbation, which introduces perceptible visual artifacts and utility degradation. We identify the visual-geolocation asymmetry: geolocation-decisive clues, such as street signs, tend to be visually peripheral but dominate location inference. Exploiting this asymmetry, we propose GeoCloak, an agentic framework for semantics-preserving geolocation privacy protection. It acts as a clue-aware planner that analyzes each image to identify geolocation-relevant clues, dispatches targeted semantic edits to directly suppress peripheral clues, and autonomously configures adversarial perturbation to further suppress residual geolocation features, all under iterative utility-aware feedback. We evaluate GeoCloak on four diverse datasets spanning 108 countries and 576 cities against five LVLMs and three inference methods. GeoCloak reduces overall city-level accuracy from 41.2% to 9.9%, approximately half of the best-performing baseline, while achieving substantially superior utility preservation both qualitatively and quantitatively. We hope this work takes a meaningful step toward practical, semantics-preserving geolocation privacy protection, giving users greater control over the location information inadvertently embedded in their shared images.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.20055
Seizure prediction and detection, essential for clinical treatment of epilepsy, remain the crucial task of this neurological disease. EEG and iEEG are widely used to analyze epilepsy due to its capability of capturing discriminative brain activities at high time resolution. However, existing works generally analyze either EEG or iEEG seizure activity separately, where EEG analysis has been well-researched, while more and more works consider iEEG for its higher specificity at the spatial level and signal quality. Currently, most of the existing seizure prediction systems are single-modal in nature, which limits its application to a variety of clinical conditions. Therefore, a common framework to analyze seizures with both EEG and iEEG signals needs to be developed. This paper presents a new framework of multimodal seizure classification integrating the heterogeneous EEG and iEEG recordings from different subjects and sources. A specific framework, called Unified Multimodal Signal Harmonization (UMSH), is developed for harmonizing signals with varied sampling rates and recording conditions. Moreover, to handle the extremely class-imbalanced problem in the data sets, we use a Conditional Generative Adversarial Network (cGAN) based data augmentation technique to generate synthetic samples to balance the class distribution. The proposed framework uses the EEGNet-Vision Transformer (EEGNet-ViT) as the feature extraction and classification network to learn the local discriminative patterns as well as global contextual information in the multimodal seizure data. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed framework for robust seizure classification, emphasizing the potential of integrated EEG-iEEG multimodal learning in advancing next-generation epilepsy monitoring and clinical decision-support systems.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.16596
Adversarial robustness distillation typically treats a robust teacher as a fixed knowledge source and transfers robustness to a compact student in a one-way manner. This paradigm terminates teacher-student interaction once the student is distilled, thereby discarding potentially useful feedback from the distilled student. However, exploiting such feedback is nontrivial because indiscriminate weak-to-strong transfer may propagate student errors to the teacher. To address this issue, we propose Cyclic Adversarial Robustness Distillation (CARD), a closed-loop framework that turns the distilled student into a feedback source for refining the robust teacher and subsequently transfers the teacher gains back to the same student. CARD first performs strong-to-weak adversarial distillation and then uses reliability-enhanced student feedback to refine the robust teacher. The refinement combines inverse adversarial student feedback with teacher-student discrepancy maximization, after which the refined teacher is used to continue training the same student under the unchanged base distillation objective. We further establish a sample-level sufficient condition for reliable weak-to-strong feedback transfer and derive a distribution-level upper bound on the refined teacher's risk. Experiments on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and TinyImageNet-10 across multiple teacher-student architectures and base distillation methods show that CARD improves adversarial robustness in most evaluated settings while generally preserving clean accuracy. These results show that the distilled student can provide useful feedback to the teacher, enabling robustness transfer to proceed beyond the conventional one-way teacher-to-student paradigm.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.19911
Recent advances in diffusion models have enabled high-fidelity, identity-preserving image generation for personalized applications such as digital avatars and virtual try-on systems. However, their reliance on sensitive facial reference images raises growing privacy concerns. Existing defense mechanisms are primarily designed for training-based personalization and struggle to generalize to emerging training-free approaches, due to fundamental differences in their identity integration paradigms. To bridge this gap, we propose IDGuardian-the first generalizable and model-agnostic identity protection framework capable of defending against both training-based and training-free personalization methods. IDGuardian abstracts the personalization process into two critical stages: identity extraction and identity injection. It then introduces crafted adversarial perturbations to simultaneously disrupt both stages. Specifically, it degrades the identity features extracted by external encoders and establishes an adversarial conceptual bridge that misdirects the generative trajectory away from the target identity. Extensive experiments show that IDGuardian effectively protects identity across various personalization pipelines and model architectures, while remaining robust to post-processing, adaptive attacks, and cross-dataset generalization. Our code is available at this https URL.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.19717
Graph retrieval-augmented generation (GraphRAG) uses document-derived knowledge graphs to assemble evidence for large language model (LLM) answers. Its security depends on both the seed chunks retrieved for a query and the graph evidence assembled from them, yet attacks on this evidence path remain underexplored. We introduce GraphRAG-LTM, a Layered Threat Modeling framework that tests three nested levels of attacker access. BB Query uses ranking feedback to make query edits under a semantic-similarity constraint and demote relevant seed chunks. WB Query uses retriever gradients for the same objective. Graph-aware WB keeps the white-box adversarial query and deletes bridge triplets from the query-specific evidence graph, disrupting multi-hop evidence propagation through localized graph edits. Across datasets, retrievers, and LLM backbones, rank feedback alone reduces answer quality, gradient access strengthens query attacks, and bridge-triplet deletion further impairs supporting-fact retrieval. Further analyses show how seed retrieval and graph evidence jointly contribute to these failures.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.19549
Layer-ablation studies often perturb early or late layers of a language model, compare the damage to prediction on two corpora, and read a larger early-layer effect on one corpus as early-layer specialization for its task. Such a comparison averages over the tokens that each corpus asks the model to predict, and these target tokens differ: math solutions, for example, ask for far more whitespace and numbers than encyclopedia prose. We show that this difference can create the appearance of depth specialization. We split a cross-corpus early--late damage interaction by target-token type and recompute it under a target mixture shared by both corpora. Between GSM8K and Wikitext, a positive interaction replicates across five model instances. In the three fully decomposed models, only whitespace has a positive interaction. Removing whitespace reverses the pooled effect in all three, and matching the full target mixture reverses it in two. The diagnosis holds under position matching, adversarial reassignment of token types, and a continuous readout. The risk can also be anticipated from the tokenizer alone. A screen computed before any model runs places every held-out pair it scored in the region its label predicts, and on the pairs it rates at high or medium risk, removing whitespace reverses every positive pooled estimate. A smaller content-word effect one token ahead follows the share of content targets that the unablated model already predicts. A cross-corpus depth effect therefore supports an interpretation of task specialization only after the target-token mixture is reported, the effect is decomposed by token type, and a mixture-matched summary keeps its sign.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.19344
Atmospheric turbulence creates complex spatial and temporal distortions that significantly reduce image quality. This work compares two deep learning methods for turbulence reduction: Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) and Transformer-based models. Both methods are trained and tested on the SOTIS dataset, which includes multi-frame sequences under different turbulence conditions with ground truth references. Our results show an important finding: GAN-based models perform better in severely degraded, low-quality situations, while Transformer-based models achieve better results in moderate to high-quality settings, especially in correcting geometric distortions. We also enhance the Turbulence Mitigation Transformer (TMT) by introducing a refined training strategy, an augmented input design that includes a temporally averaged frame as prior structural information, and a modified loss function that incorporates the Structural Similarity Index (SSIM). These improvements lead to consistent performance gains across various turbulence conditions. Overall, this study provides an in-depth evaluation of deep learning methods for turbulence reduction and offers practical guidance for selecting models in different imaging environments.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.19274
Emerging decision models such as JEV provide typed interfaces that map task instructions and observations directly to choices, judgments, and scores. As these models are increasingly used for automated decision-making, understanding their reliability under adversarial manipulation becomes critical. We introduce DecisionRobust, a benchmark for systematically evaluating the robustness of decision models across textual and visual inputs. Our benchmark covers practical decision-making scenarios and a diverse suite of attacks, including semantics-preserving text perturbations, image perturbations, and prompt injection in both modalities. We curate evaluation sets through external validity checks and cross-model candidate selection. We evaluate 30 model configurations on text tasks and 17 on vision tasks, including 24 and 12 held-out models, respectively, that are excluded from candidate selection. Our experiments reveal several key findings. First, attacks expose vulnerabilities beyond the models used for construction and selection, although optimized image perturbations transfer weakly to many targets even with multiple surrogates. Second, relative model robustness varies across tasks and attack types, and resistance to input perturbations does not necessarily imply resistance to prompt injection. Third, label-consistency checks substantially reduce measured attack success across text and image settings, highlighting the importance of validating apparent failures. The benchmark is available at this https URL.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.19118
System One models such as Jev change how software makes decisions by mapping open-ended semantic contexts into structured judgments that directly drive program execution. However, this paradigm introduces a new security risk, which we term Jev Program Decision Hijacking (JPDH): attacker-controlled contexts can redirect program decisions through schema-valid Jev judgments. Existing evaluations focus primarily on model-level attacks or predefined injection channels, leaving attack reachability and downstream security consequences in real-world Jev applications underexplored. In this paper, we present JevProbe, the first automated framework to evaluate JPDH by tracing adversarial influence from reachable context surfaces through program-consumed decisions to downstream security consequences in real-world Jev applications. Our key insight is that application logic maps diverse Jev judgments to observable decisions, enabling systematic, program-grounded attack evaluation. Across 228 popular real-world Jev applications and 2,273 test cases, 81.5% exhibit decision flips, of which 98.6% lead to potential downstream security impacts. Compared with the strongest adapted baseline, JevProbe improves macro-average Decision Flip Rate (DFR) by 50.4 percentage points, while existing defenses offer limited protection. We further construct JevProbeBench to support systematic evaluation of JPDH in real-world Jev applications. We have responsibly disclosed our findings to Jev application maintainers, pending their responses. The source code of JevProbe and the JevProbeBench dataset are publicly available on GitHub (this https URL).
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.18612
Game-theoretic benchmarks claim that large language model (LLM) strategic decision-making varies across game types, interaction structures, and capability dimensions. However, they only evaluate strategic performance across individual fixed models. In parallel, contemporary LLM routers pick models under quality-cost trade-offs, but with no notion of a strategic structure. They do not account for an opponent that might be unknown, and that can adapt over time and shift the feedback signal. To address this, we extend the game-theoretic evaluations and define strategic selection as the meta game layered on top of the base game. In each round, a strategic selector fields an LLM from a portfolio of models to navigate a game payoff matrix that is latent and learned online. We find that the evaluation signal is game-specific, and that extracting a reliable signal requires a much higher number of seed runs $N$ compared to traditional benchmarking setups. Evaluating across 5 games and 10 LLMs, we show a model's strategic competence varies significantly depending on the game setup and the opponent faced. Building on this, we implement a suite of selector methods and find that approaches that rely on query embeddings or LLM self-reflection do not consistently capture the underlying strategic signal. A lightweight multi-armed bandit algorithm performs more reliably across games, though it still falls short of the best fixed model. Finally, we show that simple non-stationary and adversarial bandit variants fail to outperform a stationary bandit baseline, pointing to a gap in how current methods handle a shifting opponent in strategic settings.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.18354