Face recognition systems (FRSs) are increasingly deployed in critical real-world services for authentication, such as banking applications and airport identity checks, necessitating stringent security configurations. Consequently, the security vulnerabilities of FRSs have garnered significant attention. While existing studies have extensively explored FRS security, prior analyses have primarily focused on medium-security threshold settings, which are not directly applicable to FRSs operating under high-security constraints. In this paper, we propose the first successful impersonation attack against FRSs under high-security threshold settings. Among various threat models, we focus on a practical and challenging scenario: score-based impersonation attacks under strict rate limits. To precisely evaluate the feasibility of such attacks, we provide a principled mathematical analysis characterizing the gaps in each stage of the attack pipeline. Our method significantly enhances impersonation capabilities in score-based attacks, even under elevated decision thresholds. On the LFW benchmark, with a budget of only 100 confidence score queries per identity, our attack achieves an impersonation success rate exceeding 92\% against Amazon Rekognition at a confidence score threshold of 99-recommended setting for law enforcement scenarios. We further observe consistently robust performance across multiple open-source FRSs evaluated at similarly stringent decision thresholds.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.20884
Model Inversion Attacks (MIAs) aim to reconstruct representative training samples of target identities from face recognition models, exposing critical security vulnerabilities. Existing methods typically rely on indirect guidance or highly stochastic guidance, making it difficult to stably optimize generation trajectories toward target facial images. In this paper, we propose Steering Flow Model Inversion (SFMI), a novel two-stage white-box model inversion method that reformulates inversion as a trajectory-steering task. Specifically, Step I, Learning a Generic Flow Matching Prior, pre-trains a generic unconditional Flow Matching model to encode the manifold of human faces as a robust prior. Step II, Attacking with Progressive Guidance Scheduler (PGS), injects time-dependent target-specific gradients during sampling. By backpropagating through the target model to obtain gradients from intermediate generated states, PGS progressively injects adaptive guidance signals into the vector field. This process effectively steers the current generative flow from random noise toward the high-density regions of the target class. Under an identity-disjoint cross-evaluation setting using the CelebA dataset, SFMI achieves an ACC of 0.9248, an FID of 22.61, and an LPIPS of 0.3874 on the ArcFace target. Extensive experiments on multiple target models demonstrate that SFMI achieves competitive state-of-the-art performance in attack success and visual fidelity under the evaluated white-box protocol.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.16791
Face recognition templates are compact identity representations, yet they also encode rich semantic information about facial appearance. Prior work has shown that templates can be inverted to images or indirectly manipulated through image-editing pipelines, but direct semantic editing in template space remains largely unexplored. Existing interpretability methods for face recognition often rely on manual neuron inspection or predefined attribute labels, limiting scalability and semantic flexibility. To address this gap, we propose SCOUT (Semantic Concept Discovery for Open-VocabUlary Editing of Face Recognition Templates), an end-to-end framework for discovering and directly manipulating semantic concepts in face recognition templates using mechanistic interpretability. SCOUT learns sparse template representations, generates semantic hypotheses for latent features from natural-language descriptions, and validates their stability. The resulting features act as controllable semantic directions for direct editing, avoiding costly edit--re-encode pipelines. Experiments with face recognition models using CNN, ViT, and Swin backbones show that SCOUT discovers interpretable concepts beyond standard attribute labels and enables controllable, identity-aware template manipulation with negligible impact on identity matching. We further show that edited templates can subsequently be decoded with independent inversion models for visualization and evaluation.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.16251
Morphing attacks pose a serious threat to face recognition systems. However, existing image-based morphing attack detection (MAD) methods often generalize poorly to unseen generation techniques because they rely solely on visual cues. We propose XSA-MAD, a CLIP-based multimodal framework that explicitly models semantic inconsistencies between bona-fide and morphed faces. Morphing concepts are decomposed into four interpretable attributes, including identity, facial geometry, texture, and consistency, and are encoded as structured and attribute-aware textual representations. The image encoder is progressively aligned with this discriminative textual space, resulting in a unified semantic representation that captures generation-invariant and concept-level discrepancies between bona-fide and morph images. Experiments on MAD22 and MorDIFF, following training on SMDD, demonstrate strong generalization across diverse morphing principles. In particular, XSA-MAD achieves an equal error rate of 2.92% on GAN-based morphs and consistently outperforms existing methods under high-fidelity generative attacks.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.13861
Face morphing attacks pose a serious threat to face recognition systems because a single morphed document image can be matched to multiple contributors. Differential morphing attack detection (D-MAD) addresses this threat by comparing a document image with a trusted live image, but existing methods often rely on static feature differences, constituent-face reconstruction, or multi-cue fusion. This paper proposes Face Re-morphing, a D-MAD method that uses the feature-space response to an additional morphing operation as a detection cue. Given a document image and a trusted live image, the proposed method generates a re-morphed image and uses the change between the document--live and live--re-morphed cosine similarities as the detection score. Experiments on FRLL-Morphs and FEI Morph show that the proposed cue is effective across different morphing conditions, re-morphing methods, and face recognition models. Comparisons with existing methods show favorable results on AMSL and indicate that the proposed method performs well under the Criminal condition on FEI Morph Version~1, particularly when using MorDIFF. These results indicate that re-morphing-induced similarity change provides a complementary cue for D-MAD.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.13858
Face recognition systems have been shown to be biased toward certain demographic groups by exhibiting different error rates across gender, age, or ethnicity. Though the imbalance of the training data with respect to these demographics is one cause of this bias, training on artificially balanced groups does not completely mitigate the problem. For deployment, face recognition typically works at operating points allowing very low false match rates and, hence, on the tail of the non-match score distribution. While class balancing can improve the means of these distributions, the aim of our approach is to improve fairness by addressing the behavior in the tail. Particularly, we propose the Demographic-based Supervised Contrastive loss (DeSCon) for face recognition, which relies on a well-designed composition of training batches and demographic-aware pair selection. Our experimental evaluation on both demographically-labeled datasets and standard verification benchmarks shows that DeSCon can improve fairness beyond balancing training datasets while maintaining competitive verification performance. Source code is available upon request.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.12971
While foundation models have significantly advanced human recognition across diverse modalities, they predominantly rely on static, geometric feature extraction. This approach fundamentally diverges from human perception. Consequently, current models often suffer from "semantic blindness," overfitting to transient noise while failing to leverage invariant soft biometrics, and struggle to capture temporal motion signatures. To bridge this gap, we propose SapiensID 2.0, a human recognition framework enriched with both semantic and temporal awareness. To overcome the lack of soft-biometric annotations, we transfer zero-shot semantic knowledge from Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) into a discriminative embedding space. We resolve the dimensional mismatch between these spaces using Invariant Trait Alignment (ITA) to distill core persistent traits, and Transient Noise Disentanglement (TND) to decouple artifacts like clothing. Furthermore, we design a Kinematic Semantic Attention Head (K-SAH) that extends spatial attention across temporal windows. By tracking semantic patches over time, K-SAH captures rich kinematic signatures without requiring large-scale video datasets. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SapiensID 2.0 achieves state-of-the-art performance across image- and video-based person re-identification and gait recognition, while maintaining robust face recognition capabilities.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.10497
Popularity of AI-based face recognition system directly demands protection of sensitive biometric data used for training. Visual secret sharing is an interesting idea, as it splits facial images into secret shares that look random and spread across many institutions. However, these shares look like noise and can easily spark suspicion and recognized as encrypted content. This makes them open to targeted collection and harvest-now-decrypt-later attacks. Additionally, visual secret sharing does not detect tampering, allowing attackers to modify shares and threaten the integrity of reconstruction. In this paper, we introduce a new method that turns distracting noise-like secret shares into visually appealing cover images with additional cryptographic tamper detection. The proposed technique works with visual secret sharing and introduces cover images to embed the shares using adaptive least significant bit steganography. Here, cover images with perceptual transparency are used to store secret shares while guaranteeing complete privacy. A two layer authentication using strong digital watermarking and cryptographic hashing is used to protect the integrity of shares. The proposed technique shows high resilience in stopping bit-flipping, cropping, and substitution attacks. Extensive experiments on multiple public face datasets show that the technique shows better FR accuracy, while eliminating share conspicuousness and guaranteeing integrity. The proposed framework sets a new standard for protecting facial data in such a way that privacy, security, and integrity are protected.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.08924
Face recognition systems face two distinct, commonly-separated failure modes: spoofing, where an impostor presents a photograph or video of an authorized user, and disguise, where a legitimate user is rejected because their appearance differs from their enrolled template due to accessories, facial hair, illumination, or pose. This paper proposes and compares five combined feature-extraction and classification pipelines that address both problems within a single framework: PM (PCA and Minimum Euclidean Distance, MED), LPM (Local Binary Patterns with PCA and MED), HPM (Histogram of Oriented Gradients with PCA and MED), SM (Speeded-Up Robust Features with MED), and HM (Harris corner features with MED). Each pipeline follows a common two-phase process comprising pre-processing, feature extraction, feature filtering, and classification. The methods were trained on 115 subjects drawn from the FEI, Disguised Faces Database, and NUAA databases and evaluated on six test conditions covering mixed appearances, frontal faces, dark illumination, left- and right-turned poses, and photo-spoofing attempts. The HOG-based pipeline (HPM) achieved the most consistent performance across conditions, with 94.59% accuracy on mixed-appearance disguise, 81.5-93.2% across pose and illumination variants, and 91.67% on spoofing, while the LBP-based pipeline (LPM) achieved the highest spoofing-detection accuracy (93.2%) but weaker robustness to pose change. These results reveal a measurable trade-off between spoof sensitivity and disguise robustness among classical feature representations, motivating the deep-learning and cross-database extensions discussed in the concluding sections.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.08521
Impersonation is a fundamental security threat in face recognition systems (FRSs). While the security of FRSs has been challenged by various attack vectors, under realistic adversarial capabilities, e.g., a limited number of decision-only authentication trials and no internal system knowledge, most attack techniques become infeasible. As a result, impersonation by zero-effort impostors, characterized by false match rate (FMR), is commonly regarded as a standalone baseline. A few years ago, impersonation attacks based on MasterFaces emerged as a notable security threat that could break the barrier of the FMR-based baseline under such realistic constraints. However, they were believed not to yield impersonation above the standard FMR in modern FRSs, as discussed by multiple follow-up studies. In this paper, we demonstrate that even legitimate access to public commercial APIs allows an adversary to amplify impersonation rates through MasterFaces, resulting in a non-trivial impersonation attack beyond FMR on downstream applications built on top of these APIs. We observe that several real-world FRS deployments are implemented using commercial APIs, and that the backend service provider is publicly disclosed or trivially inferable. As a result, the adversary can purchase these pay-as-you-go API services without requiring any additional privilege over the target FRS. From this observation, we formalize the MasterFaces attack as a maximum coverage problem over the biometric representation space, which we call a NET, and show that the adversary can construct an API-tailored NET by leveraging the geometric structure of the representation space. We demonstrate that our attack amplifies the impersonation rates of several open-source and commercial API-based FRSs by up to 9.5$\times$ within at most 30 authentication trials, compared to those expected from the standard FMR.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06952
Face Recognition (FR) systems in surveillance settings often encounter Low Resolution (LR) faces, those whose face region falls below the standard 112 $\times$ 112 input size. While labelled High Resolution (HR) training data is abundant, labelled native-LR data, and above all paired native LR/HR data, is scarce. One workaround is to synthesize LR data from the available HR faces, but how much synthesis effort is repaid in recognition accuracy remains unclear. We present a study of simple synthetic generation strategies for a compact, edge device-oriented face recognition system, spanning interpolation-based degradation, knowledge distillation, a Prepended Domain Transformer (PDT), Real ESRGAN-style degradation, and a learned Super Resolution (SR) front-end with an identity-aware loss. We evaluate these strategies on synthetic cross-resolution face benchmarks (LFW, CFP-FP, AgeDB-30) and on TinyFace, a real-world native LR dataset, and expose a synthetic-real gap: the degradation setting that is optimal on synthetic benchmarks is not the one that is optimal on real LR. We find that more synthesis effort does not help monotonically: the learned SR front-end does not surpass a direct feed of the aligned LR image into a strong backbone, while simple interpolation augmentation of a compact backbone is the only synthesis that improves over its own baseline. We conclude that generative methods for LR face recognition must be validated on real LR and against a direct-feed baseline, and release our pipeline at this https URL
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06580
Video surveillance in public safety, healthcare, and smart environments has made continuous human monitoring routine, raising real risks to personal identity and appearance. Privacy-preserving action recognition (PPAR) tackles the tension between the utility of video understanding and this exposure, and has drawn fast-growing interest. However, existing surveys remain narrow. Most catalog a single mechanism family, predate recent adversarial and hybrid work, or barely address evaluation. The result is a fragmented literature with incompatible threat models, inconsistent metrics, and no shared evaluation standard. We address this with a PRISMA-guided review of 32 peer-reviewed papers (2018--2026) drawn from 885 screened records. Methods sort into five families, namely adversarial learning (52%), skeleton-based (20%), cryptographic (12%), differential privacy (8%), and hybrid (8%), each with distinct privacy, utility, and efficiency trade-offs. Evaluation is the weak point. Only 10% of papers adopt a formal privacy definition, 65% rely on ad-hoc metrics, and 40% report an inconsistently defined cMAP. The trade-offs are steep. Skeleton methods reach about 85% accuracy but drop appearance, adversarial methods hold near 80% utility at moderate privacy (cMAP 0.9 to 0.3--0.5), and differential privacy often falls below 70%. Harder conditions stay under-tested, with fewer than 15% of papers checking cross-dataset generalization, under 10% testing adaptive attackers, and real-time edge deployment nearly untouched. We contribute a two-dimensional privacy-space taxonomy, a formal threat model, a comparative trade-off analysis, the PPAR Unified Evaluation Protocol, and a roadmap centered on benchmark standardization. With this grounding, we argue PPAR can move from prototypes toward deployment, with lessons extending to face recognition and medical imaging.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.04501
Synthetic face datasets are increasingly used to reduce privacy exposure and data access constraints in biometric recognition. Yet the generators that produce these datasets are trained on real faces, so synthetic data may still reveal their real source data. We study this risk through a dataset-level membership inference attack that first identifies the synthetic dataset used to train a face recognizer and then infers the real dataset used to train the generator. Across 11 face recognition models, 11 synthetic datasets, and 7 real datasets, the attack recovers the synthetic training dataset in 100% of cases and identifies the generator's source dataset in 54.5% of cases. These results show that synthetic data can retain dataset-level traces of real training data and that privacy-preserving deployment requires stronger leakage mitigation.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.29144
Facial biometric identification relies on the distinctiveness of user attributes within a high-dimensional embedding space. However, the decision boundaries of deep face recognition (FR) systems are often sufficiently narrow that they can be conflated, rendering the models vulnerable to adversarial attacks. In such scenarios, the FR system fails to distinguish between an authentic source and a meticulously crafted adversarial face. Existing adversarial methods targeting facial biometrics are limited in both performance and their ability to generate high-quality images that are imperceptible to humans. Moreover, these methods often fail when the source and target images belong to different demographic groups or genders. To address these limitations, we present a novel approach for adversarial face generation via latent-space optimization. We leverage latent diffusion models directly to guide generation toward target identity embeddings, as measured by a face recognition model. Our proposed \textbf{DiffAttack} framework has been evaluated on standard benchmarks, such as the FFHQ and CelebA-HQ datasets. DiffAttack significantly outperforms existing adversarial techniques, achieving a high average attack success rate of 84.86% across multiple face recognition models (e.g., FaceNet). Notably, DiffAttack demonstrates superior transferability, surpassing traditional noise-based methods by over 15.28% and semantic-based approaches by approximately 5.21% on benchmark datasets like FFHQ and CelebA-HQ.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.28936
Publishing private face recognition~(FR) training datasets is privacy-sensitive because faces expose identity information. Private FR training dataset publication mitigates this risk by releasing protected proxies as substitutes for private training faces. However, training FR models with such data introduces an identity paradox: \emph{the identity cues that make released faces useful for recognition supervision are also the cues that make them linkable to real individuals.} A protected face should be decoupled from the original identity, yet still behave as a reliable identity sample for training. Removing these cues too aggressively may destroy the class structure needed for recognition learning, whereas preserving them too faithfully may increase source-identity linkability. We argue that this paradox stems from conflating source-aligned identity semantics with recognition-useful proxy identity geometry. The former should be suppressed to reduce linkage to private individuals, while the latter should be preserved for FR learning. Based on this insight, we propose \textbf{Private Face Distillation}, an identity-decoupling and geometry-preserving framework. It uses Orthogonal Geometry Preservation to construct decoupled proxy identities from private identity representations while maintaining hyperspherical geometry, and Relational Topology Alignment to preserve identity relations for recognition learning. Experiments across multiple domain-shifted FR scenarios show that Private Face Distillation achieves stronger utility than the evaluated publication baselines. On IJB-C surveillance, it improves $\mathrm{TAR}@\mathrm{FAR}{=}1\text{e-}{3}$ by 3.94\% over the baseline while reducing source-identity linkability. These results suggest that private FR training dataset publication should decouple source-identity correspondence while preserving proxy identity geometry.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.27764
A growing number of applications, such as biometrics and retrieval-augmented generation (RAG), rely on cosine similarity scores computed between vector embeddings of text, images, or audio. These systems return similarity scores through their APIs for ranking and verification. However, such releases can leak information about individual records and enable membership inference attacks. While differential privacy (DP) provides a principled metric for quantifying attack risks, naïve application of DP mechanisms---such as adding i.i.d. Gaussian noise to vector entries---leads to excessive distortion (i.e., low utility) at a given privacy constraint that scales poorly with the number of released scores. We propose \textsc{ScoreShield}, a perturb-then-project mechanism that adds Gaussian noise calibrated to global sensitivity of the chosen score release regime and then projects the result onto the feasibility set of valid cosine objects. \textsc{ScoreShield} satisfies $(\varepsilon,\delta)$-DP for releasing similarity score vectors and Gram matrices. We provide utility guarantees for the exact Frobenius metric projection used in the risk analysis, and prove convergence to feasibility for the practical averaged alternating-projection solver used for large-scale Gram releases. For full pairwise cosine Gram release under record-level replacement adjacency, the exact-projection bound improves the $n$-dependence of squared Frobenius risk from $\Theta(n^3)$ for the naïve Gaussian baseline to $\mathcal{O}(n^2)$ for fixed privacy parameters, with sharper local bounds at low-rank Grams. We evaluate the mechanism across RAG, face recognition, semantic retrieval, image similarity, and recommender-system tasks.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.25041
This paper presents a summary of the Competition on Adapting Foundation Models for Face Recognition Using Synthetic Training Data (AFMFR), held at the 2026 International Joint Conference on Biometrics (IJCB 2026). The competition received a total of eight valid submissions from four distinct teams across two complementary tracks: a Full Data Track, in which participants adapt the CLIP ViT-L/14 foundation model using large-scale synthetic identity data, and a Limited Data Track, designed to reflect more resource-constrained adaptation regimes. All training data was generated exclusively using IDPERTURB. Submitted solutions are ranked based on verification and identification performance across a diverse suite of benchmarks, including LFW, CFP-FP, AgeDB-30, CALFW, CPLFW, IJB-B, IJB-C, and TinyFace, using the Borda count method. Fairness evaluation is additionally conducted on the RFW dataset across four demographic groups. The results demonstrate that adaptation of the CLIP foundation model with synthetic training data substantially improves over the off-the-shelf model and, in several cases, surpasses the baseline. Notably, full fine-tuning with Sub-Center ArcFace (DMSTI-Neurotechnology) leads the Full Data Track, while rank-stabilized LoRA adaptation (Idiap-BSP) proves most effective under limited-data conditions.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.24422
The recently deployed Entry/Exit System (EES) introduces large-scale biometric verification into European border control, requiring face recognition systems to operate at extremely low false match rates (FMR). While regulatory frameworks define performance targets at the EES Central System level, they do not specify how verification thresholds should be calibrated in practice at the Member State level. In operational settings, obtaining representative real-world data for calibration is often constrained by legal, logistical, and privacy limitations. In this work, we investigate the use of synthetic face data for threshold calibration in document-to-live verification scenarios relevant to border control systems. We analyze the alignment of genuine and impostor score distributions between synthetic and real datasets and evaluate the transferability of calibrated thresholds across domains, with a focus on low-FMR operating points. Our results show that synthetic data can approximate calibration behavior in controlled settings, but fails to reliably generalize to unconstrained conditions due to mismatches in score distribution tails. These discrepancies lead to significant degradation in recognition performance and increased vulnerability to morph-based attacks. We further demonstrate that calibration outcomes are highly dataset-dependent, even across synthetic datasets. Overall, our findings highlight that while synthetic data is useful for system development and preliminary calibration, our results indicate that reliable threshold selection in high-security deployments typically requires validation and adjustment using representative real-world data.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.25990
With the development of precision livestock farming and the advances in computer vision, visual animal biometrics has gained attention. Using biometric technologies that have been proven effective for humans to identify livestock can increase animal welfare as well as production efficiency. However, challenges such as complex scenarios, similar appearances, occlusions, and non-cooperative behavior, as well as the limited amount of publicly available labeled datasets, remain. In this work, we contribute a novel, publicly available cow face benchmark dataset that has been collected in a realistic automatic scenario with 6,838 images of 161 different cows at a dairy farm. In addition to the public dataset, we define two verification and four identification evaluation protocols to foster comparable research in the cow recognition research field. Further, we provide evaluation results on our dataset of six benchmark models, which include models trained on limited data, cross-species fine-tuned models, and zero-shot foundation model approaches.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.22071
Students and working professionals have to go through the attendance process every day. Traditional methods of marking attendance using pen and paper or online platforms are human-intensive and time-consuming. To address the challenges in manual attendance processes, this research explores the use of face detection (FD) and face recognition (FR) technology to automate the attendance process, particularly in educational settings, and build a ClassVision course attendance system. We also propose an automated attendance system featuring a human-computer interaction (HCI) and user-friendly web interface that utilizes real-time image processing to identify and recognize students in classrooms and automatically record their attendance. We identified RetinaFace as the best face detection model, and when combined with Face Recognition for verification, it provided the most promising results with a cropped embedding of 50x50 pixels.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.26173