Safety-aligned language models are commonly deployed as multi-turn assistants, which lets adversaries spread unsafe intent across several user turns instead of a single prompt. Gradient-based jailbreak detectors such as GradSafe were developed for single prompts: they score an input by the alignment between its induced gradient and a fixed unsafe reference direction, and their effectiveness in multi-turn dialogue remains unclear. We conduct a controlled evaluation of gradient-based jailbreak detection in multi-turn settings. We extend GradSafe with a Context Window Scanner that applies the detector to fixed-size windows of user turns and uses the maximum window score as the conversation-level score. We evaluate different window sizes, attack families, benign conversation distributions, and target models. The results differ sharply between synthetic and realistic benign settings. Against synthetic benign conversations, the detector achieves an ROC-AUC of 0.98 on human-authored multi-turn jailbreaks. On WildChat benign conversations, ROC-AUC drops to 0.76, and a threshold calibrated on synthetic data flags more than 90% of benign conversations as unsafe. Under realistic benign distributions, single-turn windows give the highest separability, whereas longer windows and accumulated contexts reduce performance. The detector is also sensitive to the attack-generation method and target model: successful Crescendo attacks receive scores comparable to or lower than benign conversations, and Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct yields near-random separability with a different optimal window size. These findings show that gradient-based signals can support multi-turn jailbreak detection, but reliable deployment requires calibration on realistic benign conversations, short-window scoring, length-aware thresholds, and evaluation across attack types and model architectures.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.36849
Deepfakes no longer need to fake a whole video. Generators that read the transcript now alter only the few seconds in which a video's meaning turns, so a forgery hides in a small, unknown fraction of the video. Yet detectors still read every one-second window of both the audio and image streams, spending nearly all of their compute where nothing was altered. We observe that deciding where to look is far cheaper than looking. We present ModalFidelity, a lightweight router that previews each window and decides, before any forensic detector runs, which stream is worth reading, under a hard compute budget it can never exceed. On AV-Deepfake1M, reading at most a fifth of the windows, it is more accurate than gating after the detectors at 15.9x less compute, and retains over 96% of the accuracy of an oracle that knows where every forgery lies.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.38246
The rapid evolution of image generators calls for forensic cues that generalize beyond known generation mechanisms. Existing detectors often rely on static image representations or endpoint reconstruction discrepancies, leaving the evolution of intermediate reconstruction stages underexplored. We observe that the relative token predictability of real and generated images can reverse across reconstruction scales, suggesting that intermediate stages may expose forensic evidence overlooked by endpoint comparisons. Motivated by this observation, we propose RED (Reconstruction Evolution Dynamics), a framework that captures transferable forensic cues from coarse-to-fine reconstruction evolution. To our knowledge, RED is the first framework to use scale-wise token predictability to guide forensic evidence aggregation across intermediate reconstruction states. It represents the reconstruction trajectory produced by a frozen multiscale VQ-VAE in the shared feature space of a frozen CLIP encoder. To connect the observed predictability variations with visual evidence, RED learns image-adaptive stage weights from scale-wise token negative log-likelihoods provided by a frozen VAR model. A cross-stage evidence aggregation module then jointly models the original-image representation and the weighted reconstruction features, capturing complementary forensic cues through interactions along the reconstruction trajectory. Experiments on six diverse benchmarks demonstrate that RED achieves the highest average accuracy of 92.5\% and average precision of 97.5\% among the evaluated methods. Further evaluations show strong robustness to common image degradations, supporting the value of reconstruction evolution for generalizable AI-generated image detection. The code will be made publicly available upon acceptance of this paper.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.36822
Training-free online video anomaly detection (VAD) with frozen multimodal language models faces two coupled challenges: extracting reliable current-window semantics under causal and computational constraints, and maintaining temporal continuity without repeatedly transmitting high-dimensional history. Encoding history through text can compress visual evidence and introduce semantic bias, whereas retaining visual history expands multimodal context. We introduce PARSEE-VAD, a two-module framework that separates semantic evidence acquisition from score-state evolution. Proposition-Aware Reasoning (PAR) extracts structured propositional evidence from the current causal window and conditionally activates more specific queries when coarse evidence warrants further refinement. By sharing a reusable causal visual prefix across queries, PAR reduces redundant computation through selective execution. Streaming Evidence Escalation (SEE) maps the acquired proposition evidence into a compact score-domain event state through current evidence escalation, then propagates only the resulting bounded state across decisions to support temporal continuity. Experiments on four benchmarks demonstrate strong training-free online performance while selective routing reduces specialist computation and score-state propagation remains sparse. These results support a current-first principle for streaming multimodal inference: resolve present semantics first, then use compact historical state only to repair residual continuity gaps.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.33236
Language models (LMs) often hallucinate by committing to confident answers rather than abstaining, even when they do not have enough information to answer reliably. A large body of existing work mitigates hallucination through detection or abstention mechanisms, but leaves open how models internally arrive at the decision to commit or abstain in the first place. We study this decision through mechanistic analysis, framing hallucination as unsupported commitment: the model commits despite exhibiting signals of unanswerability. Using causal gating, we identify a Commit-Abstain Circuit (CAC), a sparse, causally localised subset of attention heads and MLP sublayers underlying this decision. Across ten LMs (3B-14B) from five families and three benchmarks, the CAC exhibits a recurring accumulate-yet-undercorrect pattern: commitment-promoting components build up commitment in earlier layers, while abstention-promoting components act later as corrective signals that are often insufficient to overturn the accumulated commitment. Building on this finding, a lightweight policy trained on CAC activations improves decision accuracy by 12.2 points over the model's intrinsic commit-abstain margin, reduces false abstentions by 2.5 times, transfers to unseen benchmarks, and extends to larger models (27B-35B). The CAC is both diagnostic, clarifying how models overcommit, and practical, enabling improved abstention decisions.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.32964
Collaborative perception enables connected agents to share complementary observations for 3D object detection, extending sensing range and mitigating occlusion. Under asynchronous communication, however, cooperative features arrive with temporal delay. Existing prediction-based methods compensate for these features mainly from the transmitting agent's own history, leaving residual misalignment with the ego agent's current observation; subsequent fusion also often overlooks spatial variations in alignment quality. We propose EgoRefine, an ego-referenced predictive alignment and reliability-aware fusion framework for asynchronous collaborative perception. Its Ego-referenced Predictive Alignment module uses the current ego feature to guide cooperative trajectory-field prediction and refines the sampling offsets along an ego-referenced trajectory direction. Its Trajectory-conditioned Reliability-aware Fusion module treats the trajectory discrepancy between the ego and cooperative streams and the directional refinement magnitude as alignment cues, using them to condition the relation between aligned features and adaptively reweight the two streams before convolutional fusion. Experiments on V2V4Real and DAIR-V2X-Seq show that EgoRefine outperforms TraF-Align by 1.6 and 2.9 points on average in AP@0.5 and AP@0.7, respectively. The source code will be made publicly available at this https URL.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.00319
Indirect prompt injection makes an LLM agent treat untrusted retrieved text as instructions. We present CounterSteer, an inference-time defense that suppresses this behavior inside the model. Per model, a five-step recipe fits a residual-stream direction from paired episodes differing only in whether an embedded instruction is followed, and retains it only if it passes pre-specified causal and capability gates. At deployment, the direction is subtracted from every tool-result token during prefill. The edit is always on--there is no detection decision to evade--and requires no fine-tuning, auxiliary model, or added tokens, only white-box serving and tool-result span boundaries. Across five open-weights models (8B-106B, five vendor lineages), held-out attack success falls from 0.21-1.00 undefended to 0.00-0.17 defended, and AgentDojo compromise rate from 0.10-0.49 to 0.006-0.079, at 93-100% typography-normalized benign utility, with larger task-dependent costs when reasoning over steered content. A benchmark-level adaptive attacker reaching 0.67-0.73 undefended is held to roughly a quarter of that on the two most deeply evaluated models. Among the defenses we measured on capable models, those achieving lower compromise rates either lost 22-89% of benign utility or fine-tuned the served weights. White-box gradient attacks through the deployed vector compromise at most 2 of 52 episodes, and none of 2,052 replayed human red-team attacks succeeds. CounterSteer largely neutralizes instructional takeover: a black-box framing search cracks 3 of 18 development samples. Parameter manipulation--attacker-chosen arguments in otherwise legitimate calls--is only partially resisted (13 of 18); the decision becomes linearly readable at argument emission but not at the examined pre-generation sites, and is not removed by the tested prefill- or decode-time steering, motivating argument-provenance controls.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.36570
While Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are increasingly deployed in safety-critical domains, their reliability is threatened by multimodal implicit risks. Unlike explicit threats, these hazards emerge when individually benign text and neutral visual entities logically converge to induce unsafe outputs. Current detection methods fail to address this because they overlook the underlying risk activation mechanisms that govern cross-modal risk activation, leading to single-modality shortcut learning and hallucinated rationalizations. To bridge this gap, we first construct TriggerBench, the first dataset explicitly modeling risk compositionality (5,600 instances). By formally isolating Key Elements and Trigger Elements to build counterfactual contrastive pairs, TriggerBench eliminates risk residues and forces models to perform genuine logical deduction rather than superficial pattern matching, which provides a rigorous foundation for both large-scale training and fine-grained evaluation. Building on this, we propose a Step-Supervised Structured Reasoning training framework and employ it to train ThinkingGuard, a specialized guard model. Inspired by Situation Awareness theory, we decouple implicit risk identification into progressive cognitive stages, and utilize a step-reward Monte Carlo Tree Search algorithm to explore optimal reasoning trajectories, which are then distilled into the model through Dual-Constraint Preference Alignment. Extensive experiments across both standard and implicit safety benchmarks demonstrate that ThinkingGuard achieves strong performance. Project resources are available at this https URL.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.36562
Integrating tackiness sensation into the artificial skin of humanoid robots significantly enhances their cognitive and operational capabilities. However existing tactile sensors face challenges in decoupling of the multimodal signal and stability. Here we present a surface-soft tactile sensor that incorporates a Hall effect sensor and a soft magnetic composite within a robust elastic framework. The sensor surface indents under pressure and bulges prominently when retracted from sticky surfaces dynamically altering the Hall sensor-magnet distance. This generates whole-process-traceable and baseline-separated signals enabling real-time differentiation between pressure and pull-off force. This single-sensing-element design facilitates bimodal sensing at the same contact spot while eliminate stress cross-talk enhancing both accuracy and sensitivity. The fusion of a robust framework and magneto-mechanical sensing mechanism equips the sensor with exceptional reliability and excellent signal baseline stability. This tactile sensor holds substantial potential for advancing robotic capabilities in evaluating adhesive properties monitoring rubber aging precisely handling lightweight objects and cognizing natural objects surface characteristics.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.36558
Recent studies report that LLM-based multi-agent systems (MAS) fail at rates of 41%-87%, yet to our knowledge, no benchmark to date supports systematic anomaly detection (AD) for them. Building MAS AD benchmarks is hard because they must remain fresh as LLM systems evolve: tasks may leak into training data and thus be memorized by LLMs, traces and anomaly patterns expire as backbones evolve, and labels must be provided reliably for each refresh. To address these challenges, we present MAADBench (MA: multi-agent; AD: anomaly detection), the first refreshable MAS AD benchmark designed for diverse, evolving LLM backbones underlying the agents. MAADBench combines (1) sampled-and-coupled generative tasks over an approximately 10^37-task space to mitigate task leakage, (2) refreshable trace generation under configurable LLM backbones, and (3) automated provision of cost-free, deterministic step-level labels for fine-grained AD evaluation. Beyond offering the paradigm itself, we run MAADBench with five state-of-the-art LLM backbones and release the MAADBench-Full dataset with 5,200 step-labeled traces. Benchmarking 25 AD methods on the MAADBench dataset reveals substantial limitations in current approaches: they rely heavily on supervision, struggle with subtle MAS-specific anomalies, and lack robustness across LLM backbones. These gaps point to a rich research agenda for MAS-specific anomaly detection, with MAADBench providing a systematic and refreshable testbed for method development and evaluation. We open-source MAADBench-Full at this https URL.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.36556
We benchmarked vision-language models (VLMs) on the decisions annotators take when inspecting electron microscopy images in connectomics: synapse detection (presence and polarity) and proofreading (split errors and merge errors). For synapse detection, we evaluated 19 open and 2 closed models across various architectures and sizes under zero-shot, four-shot in-context learning and LoRA settings, against specialist models, on datasets constructed by us using public resources. For proofreading, we evaluated 3 open and 2 closed models on the ConnectomeBench2 dataset, with cross-species transfer from fly and mouse to human and zebrafish. Most models were at chance zero-shot; a few examples helped mainly the closed and largest open ones. LoRA on a few thousand labels brought open models level with specialist models. When evaluated on unseen species, the best adapted VLMs outperformed specialist models trained on the same data in identifying merge errors. The project will be publicly available upon acceptance.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.36492
Latent space monitors aim to detect undesired behaviors in LLM agents by inspecting an agent's internal activations rather than its outputs. However, interactive monitoring creates a feedback channel where each verdict the monitor delivers leaks information to the model about how its internal states are being evaluated. We ask whether an agent can infer the monitor's decision rule from this feedback and then selectively edit its activations to evade detection. Unlike prior evasion attacks, the model is never explicitly told what the monitor detects. Surprisingly, off-the-shelf models already produce activation edits aligned with the monitored direction, but at insufficient magnitude for evasion. Simply scaling up these edits by a factor of 8 reduces the monitor's TPR from 100% to 27%. A rank-1 LoRA amplifies this behavior into effective evasion within the forward pass, reducing TPR further to 4% on held-out concept monitors while leaving other concepts at their normal detection rates. Capabilities on standard benchmarks are retained under this finetuning, and the evasion skill survives retraining the monitors on the new activations. Mechanistically, we find evidence that the model computes its activation edit from the prior in-context turns, and show that the edit becomes more aligned with the monitored direction as more examples are provided. These results demonstrate feedback-conditioned control over activations and suggest that latent monitoring should be treated as an interactive process in which agents can observe and respond to oversight measures.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.36490
Guard models are used as safety classifiers, with confidence scores driving downstream moderation decisions. We evaluate five guard models for prompt classification and find that although several are nearly calibrated on clean inputs, adversarial attacks degrade their calibration by an order of magnitude, turning false negatives into high-confidence errors indistinguishable from correct detections. Comparing each guard with its corresponding base LM, we find that uncertainty signals often remain available, with the base model typically expressing uncertainty on the same inputs where the guard fails. Layer-wise analyses localize this guard-base divergence to later layers, where guard models exhibit sharper safe/unsafe separation and lower-rank representations, while adversarial harmful inputs lie closer to the clean-safe region. These findings highlight a mismatch between guard confidence and base model uncertainty under attack.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.36477
Large AI models increasingly rely on distributed GPU execution, yet it remains unclear whether established failure analysis methods transfer effectively to this setting. We introduce GF-Bench, a PyTorch-based framework and dataset for generating diverse failures in distributed GPU workloads. The framework supports extensible workload and fault-injection logic; based on this design, the current release targets failures visible in multi-GPU communication logs and provides 220 labeled two-GPU executions covering normal runs, CUDA out-of-memory fail-stop failures, and persistent straggler fail-slow failures. Using GF-Bench, we evaluate three sequence-based methods (DeepLog, LogAnomaly, and LogBERT) and the LLM-based LogPrompt on parsed logs, and additionally evaluate LogPrompt on raw logs. On parsed inputs, no method reliably detects both failure classes, and the highest overall F1 score is 0.667. Raw inputs raise the overall F1 score of in-context LogPrompt to 0.983, at 9.0x its average input-token usage and 8.7x its per-run cost. These results expose a substantial trade-off between effectiveness and efficiency: generic log parsing lowers operational cost but discards the distributed execution context required for accurate failure detection. GF-Bench provides a reproducible basis for studying cost-efficient analysis methods and can be extended to additional GPU workloads and failure types.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.14009
Multi-cancer segmentation in computed tomography (CT) is fundamentally limited by the scarcity of tumor masks across different organs. We present Merlin Plus, the first large-scale CT dataset with radiologist-created tumor masks across 9 organs. Merlin Plus extends the Merlin dataset by adding 1,153 per-voxel tumor masks and longitudinal metadata. To create these tumor masks, we developed a report-based active-learning framework in which radiology reports identify tumor cases for annotation and support training of a tumor segmentation model. The model generates initial masks, which radiologists review and correct to produce the final masks, reducing annotation burden while maintaining high-quality annotations. Besides tumor masks, the longitudinal metadata in Merlin Plus enables temporal modeling of cancer progression. By directly addressing the major bottleneck of limited multi-cancer segmentation masks, Merlin Plus supports scalable multi-organ cancer detection, segmentation, and longitudinal analysis in CT. Dataset is available at: this https URL
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.36436
A detector pretrained on a broad corpus is fine-tuned on a narrow domain, its in-domain accuracy improves, and it ships. We ask what happens meanwhile to its coverage of objects the vocabulary never names, which in obstacle detection and inspection carry the risk. No in-domain test set holds an example of one. We give a longitudinal protocol: one pretrained checkpoint against its own fine-tuned descendants. It tracks held-out top-$K$ proposal coverage $C_\tau$: of categories pretraining covered and the vocabulary omits, the share of boxes a detector's top $K$ regions still cover. The quantity is the open-world proposal literature's; the longitudinal reading is not. $C_\tau$ falls while in-domain accuracy rises, on four architectures and three domains, by $5.12$ to $63.35$ points on boxes above $1024$ px$^2$. No in-domain number identifies the fall, and neither does detection average precision, which charges a missed and a misnamed box alike. On the one architecture scoring both, adaptation costs $87\%$ of the AP against a fifth of the coverage, and the naming goes first at all six depths of its freeze ladder, every run. What breaks is structured: three architectures sharing no pretraining run agree on which categories lose coverage, and those a model never learned do not lose any. A repair follows and needs no training: mixing a quarter of the pretrained state back, normalisation statistics included, raises coverage on every cell swept for at most $2.47$ points of in-domain accuracy. Seeing it costs one extra evaluation pass.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.36426
Relational in-context learning (ICL) uses labeled support examples and their linked relational context to predict labels for new queries. This creates a failure mode when target-derived features are present in the support context but unavailable for the query. We study this setting as support-set target leakage. We construct 20 controlled target-derived features that vary in signal fidelity, representation, semantic transparency, coverage, and zero-, one-, and two-hop relational placement, and evaluate them across 13 RelBench tasks and five relational ICL configurations that vary the ICL head, message-passing depth, pretraining cohort, or relational encoder architecture. We evaluate matched 0-hop, 1-hop, and 2-hop leakage settings, together with a Full leakage condition containing all 20 leaker columns. Within the tested configurations, target-table (0-hop) and Full leakage produce the largest aggregate deviations from clean evaluation, while higher-hop effects are often weaker, consistent with differences in effective exposure associated with temporal reachability, sampling, and aggregation fidelity. Leakage effects are strongly task- and model-dependent and can reverse relative conclusions between model variants even when aggregate changes are small. For leaker detection, we compare an Integrated Gradients (IG)-based screening method with mutual information (MI) and leave-one-column-out (LOCO) on a common Baseline subset. Ranking quality is strongest in the high-impact 0-hop and Full leakage conditions, but detector-based removal does not consistently restore the clean evaluation. A four-task rel-salt case study further shows the same evaluation concern with native-schema leakage candidates from the original relational schema. These results identify the support/query information boundary as an important component of reliable relational ICL evaluation.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.36417
Teams of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) deployed for search and monitoring missions frequently operate as partially connected networks, forcing each robot to trade off exploring the environment against relaying information to teammates. This tradeoff is especially acute when robots are semantically heterogeneous: an observation that appears uninformative to the robot that made it may be critical to a teammate with complementary detection capabilities. In this work, we formalize this setting as the heterogeneous mission-aware coverage (HMAC) problem, which couples complete multi-robot coverage of an area with capability-constrained mission-relevant target (MRT) discovery under intermittent communication. We then present DORA, a divergence-oriented data-relay algorithm that drives communication by the value of information to the team rather than by discovery alone. DORA quantifies the mission-relevant divergence between a robot's current information state and its estimate of each teammate's knowledge, capturing mission relevance, discovery novelty, sensor uncertainty, and the age of information. We evaluate DORA in simulation across four environments with differing object densities and spatial structure, and validate it on a physical UAV platform. Our results show that DORA improves MRT resolution delay by up to 74.8% over traditional time-based communication scheduling methods.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.36395
An event camera produces an asynchronous stream, but what is visible in that stream depends on how a downstream consumer, such as a model or detector, processes time. The same timestamp change may leave a coarse temporal representation unchanged while changing the response of a model that preserves finer timing. We characterize this dependence as observer-relative stealth. For recorded event streams, retiming an event within its protected accumulation window leaves the accumulated integer tensor exactly unchanged. We use this exact blind space to construct Null, a gradient-guided timestamp-retiming attack, and define SC-ASR_A(tau) to measure attack success while bounding the change visible to observer A. On DVS Gesture at a 10% event budget, Null reaches 81.56 +/- 5.81% ASR on ConvSNN and 98.67 +/- 0.45% on a GRU while preserving the protected tensor exactly. On DailyDVS-200, a protocol-scale Multi-View Fusion Network variant reaches 99.28 +/- 0.11% exact-null ASR, compared with 9.70 +/- 1.06% for its matched control. In a five-attack comparison, Null is the only method with nonzero attack success at exact observer equality, reaching 81.4% on DVS Gesture and 87.35% on DailyDVS-200. We also search the same exact blind space with an independently implemented constrained projected-gradient optimizer, C-PGD. At matched victim-gradient evaluations, C-PGD reaches 84.50 +/- 2.89% ASR on DVS Gesture and 89.55 +/- 4.39% on DailyDVS-200, again with exact protected equality. Perturbations that are exactly hidden from the protected observer become visible under shifted, finer, overlapping, and randomized temporal views. Adding observer constraints reduces the real-valued blind-space fraction from 87.5% to 75.0% to 62.5%, while DVS ConvSNN ASR falls from 74.9% to 61.9% to 37.2%. These results show that stealth is not a property of the perturbation alone.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.36386
Relational in-context learning (ICL) conditions predictions on the labeled support examples and their linked tables, creating a failure mode when the support set contains target-derived features that are unavailable for the query. We formulate this problem as support-set target leakage, distinct from leakage during dataset construction, temporal splitting, or representation learning. Here, the target-derived (leaker) columns are present only in the labeled support set during relational in-context inference, while queries remain clean. We construct 14 synthetic leaker types, corresponding to 20 columns, spanning proxies with different noise levels, coverage, modalities, semantic transparency, and relational distances. We evaluate a frozen relational encoder with an ICL head on held-out RelBench databases and use Integrated Gradients (IG) to rank and remove suspicious columns. Our results show that the effect of support-set leakage varies across tasks and relational distances. Target-table leakers cause the clearest degradation, while one- and two-hop leakers are not consistently used by the model. IG ranks target-table leakers highly across datasets and partially recovers performance in settings where leakage has the largest effect.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.36384