Earthquake catalogs underpin studies such as fault structure, earthquake processes and seismic hazard, and their value depends on being both complete and reliable. Machine learning has improved individual tasks of earthquake monitoring, but processing stations independently discards the consistency of arrivals across the network, and running tasks in sequence fragments the information describing each earthquake. We present EQNet2, a geometry-aware multi-station Transformer that jointly predicts phase arrivals, first-motion polarities, source location and magnitude, and the association of arrivals into events. On a Northern California test dataset and on continuous waveforms from Ridgecrest and the San Francisco Bay Area, EQNet2 recovers more weak arrivals, produces fewer false detections, and associates more picks into located events. Its learned attention links information across stations along time--distance patterns consistent with seismic moveout. As seismic networks grow denser, exploiting multi-station coherence and event-centric prediction offers a path to more complete and reliable catalogs.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.17404
Continuous monitoring of generative AI systems requires detecting distribution shifts in the unstructured data they ingest and generate. Existing monitoring methods typically control false alarms by requiring the discrepancy measure used to detect shifts to be *pre-specified*. However, for unstructured data, pre-specification creates a sensitivity--breadth trade-off: a narrowly defined measure is sensitive to the anticipated shift but may miss unexpected changes, whereas a broadly defined measure may detect a wider range of shifts but with reduced sensitivity. Although adaptively hypothesizing the shift direction can overcome this limitation, such data-dependent adaptation generally invalidates conventional false-alarm guarantees. We reconcile adaptivity with statistical validity through testing-by-betting, reframing sequential changepoint detection as a betting game in which the bettor continually updates its hypothesized shift direction, or witness function, as new observations arrive. We introduce *asymptotic e-detectors*, which approximate the pre-change distribution using a calibration set of size $m$, and prove that they asymptotically control the average run length to a false alarm as $m$ increases. Empirically, calibration sets as small as $m=30$ provide effective control. We then develop adaptive monitoring strategies ranging from black-box bettors that learn from embeddings to interpretable bettors based on LLM-proposed concepts. Across three real-world datasets, including data from a clinical AI scribe deployment, adaptive monitors detect shifts faster than fixed monitors at the same false-alarm level. Further, when the true shifts are sparse and interpretable, LLM-concept monitors provide the fastest and most interpretable detection, while also guiding root-cause diagnosis for complex shifts.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.17399
Propaganda detection systems usually operate as black boxes, lacking explanations. To address this, we hypothesise that persuasive techniques contain definitional characteristics with respect to their social-political setting. We introduce ReCoT, a reasoning-conditioned detection framework that captures definitional cues of persuasive techniques via population-level refinement and performance-guided resampling, without requiring additional explanation annotations. On INDI-PROPspan, ReCoT achieves a macro F1_LCS of 0.364, surpassing baselines and reaching 88% of the SFT upper bound on Avg F1_LCS. Similarly, on PTC, ReCoT reaches 85% of the SFT upper bound on Avg F1_LCS, closing much of this gap while remaining interpretable. Importantly, the analysis of the reasoning pool's convergence and update pattern for ReCoT shows effective refinement of reasoning CoTs.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.17271
A model diff credits post-training with whatever separates a base checkpoint from one post-trained descendant, presuming a rerun would land close by. On the sparse co-activation graph of Qwen3-1.7B it does not: two LoRA-SFT reruns sit over half as far apart as either sits from the base. We score each base-to-post contrast against the run-to-run band of its own recipe, and show that $k$ runs certify no better than $p=1/(k+1)$ under run exchangeability, however large the effect, so the band $z$-score is a descriptive scale. SFT leaves a large, reproducible signature: base $\to$ SFT displaces the graph by 17.8 pairwise-distance SDs beyond the mean distance between four independent LoRA-SFT runs, and the pre-registered estimator replicates on Llama-3.1-8B with Llama-Scope. At 29 steps each, four SFT and four DPO runs occupy disjoint displacement ranges, a gap $5.0\times$ and $5.6\times$ the spreads of the two arms, without any band. All bands use graphs built on one GPU architecture. Three other readings stop short of a verdict: DPO band counts (3/4, 1/4, 3/4 contrasts outside at 12, 29, 60 steps) show no consistent dose ordering while its displacement stays flat; light GRPO is a secondary non-detection, not an absence, and we run no equivalence test; and the graph concentration read as an RL signature is already in the zero-RL base. A pre-registered causal sweep at three edge budgets on 4,816 held-out prompts found the displaced sources load-bearing ($12\times$ a matched random control in mean, $3.5\times$ in median at 10,000 edges), but their stage-specificity interaction reversed at two budgets and the third failed its faithfulness gate, so we claim calibrated structural displacement, not a changed mechanism. Scope: one backbone, one SFT recipe and general-text probe states for the full protocol.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.17093
Memory-augmented LLM-based agents are vulnerable to memory injection attacks: Agents may retrieve poisoned memory from attackers, which diverts their behavior from initial user intent and finally causes task failure. However, existing defense mechanisms either incur high computational cost or suffer from information redundancy in multi-turn contexts. To address these challenges, we propose Memory Intent-Aware Neural Denoising(MIND), a lightweight defense framework for memory injection attack. Our preliminary analysis reveals that benign and poisoned trajectories exhibit distinguishable relationships between the initial user intent and subsequent behavior. Building on this observation, MIND employs an intent-aware Information Bottleneck(IB) to extract compact intent--behavior representations from the initial intent and turn-level behavior. The IB preserves intent-relevant cross-turn attack signals while filtering task-irrelevant and repetitive information, and a lightweight detector identifies malicious memories from the resulting representations. As such, MIND mitigates information redundancy in multi-turn contexts while avoiding the overhead of repeated LLM auditing. Extensive experiments show that MIND reduces attack success rates while preserving task accuracy and inference efficiency. Notably, on ReAct-StrategyQA, MIND reduces mean ASR-r and ASR-a by 58.1% and 53.5%, respectively, while matching the undefended agent in average accuracy and latency.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.28103
Detecting credit card fraud is notoriously difficult because fraudulent charges make up less than 0.2% of total transactions. Quantum Machine Learning (QML), particularly Quantum Kernel Support Vector Machines (QSVM), promises richer feature representations by embedding classical data into high-dimensional Hilbert spaces. However, whether this theoretical advantage holds up when managing real-world financial data bottlenecks remains unclear. We designed a controlled benchmark comparing three quantum encodings, Angle, ZZFeatureMap, and IQP against classical models while keeping sample sizes, feature counts, and scaling strictly matched. To handle class skew without corrupting quantum state overlaps, we embedded synthetic minority oversampling (SMOTE) directly into the quantum Gram matrix workflow, raising PR-AUC scores by roughly +0.04 across feature maps. When trained on the full European credit card dataset with 30 features, classical baselines reached a top PR-AUC of 0.983. However, restricting classical models to match QSVM hardware constraints (500 samples, 4 PCA features) dropped their PR-AUC to 0.750. This puts our best quantum result 0.730 PR-AUC using IQP encoding on 150 samples into realistic context. Testing on physical quantum hardware reduced performance further to 0.62 due to CNOT gate errors and thermal noise. Overall, our findings pinpoint two main operational bottlenecks for near-term quantum kernels: the scaling of Gram matrix evaluation and heavy information loss from squeezing features onto small qubit registers.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.17027
Standard hate speech detection datasets often emphasize explicit harmful language, but directed harm can also be expressed indirectly, without clearly hateful wording. Sarcasm is one such form of indirect expression, as it can convey harmful intent through mock praise, exaggeration, humor, or apparent politeness. In this paper, we introduce SarcasTraps, a targeted external test set for analyzing the effect of sarcasm on Turkish hate speech detection. SarcasTraps contains 479 entries annotated along two dimensions: hate speech and sarcasm. We train classifiers using BERTurk and XLM-RoBERTa on two existing Turkish hate speech datasets and evaluate them on SarcasTraps, using it strictly as an external test set. We also evaluate GPT-4.1 and Llama-3.3-70B in a zero-shot setting on SarcasTraps. Results show that sarcasm substantially affects hate speech detection. Fine-tuned encoder models lose recall on sarcastic hate, while zero-shot LLMs maintain higher recall but suffer substantial precision drops on sarcastic examples. These findings show that both fine-tuned hate speech detectors and zero-shot LLMs struggle when sarcasm is involved, and SarcasTraps provides quantitative evidence of this challenge through a targeted Turkish test set. Due to the presence of sensitive and hateful language, SarcasTraps will be shared upon request for academic research purposes. Warning: This paper has examples from the dataset which contains offensive and hateful content towards groups of people.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.16957
Large audio-language models (LALMs) are fast becoming a general interface to sound, yet how far their broad pretraining carries into specialized domains remains largely open. Vessel monitoring, maritime safety, and ocean sensing all depend on recognizing underwater signals, but to our knowledge LALMs have not been systematically evaluated on them. Annotated recordings are costly to collect, and a faithful synthetic alternative has to bring together many interacting factors: the structure of detection pulses, communication waveforms, and ship-radiated noise, and the sound-speed profile, geometry, and multipath propagation through which each reaches the receiver. We address this by proposing \textbf{UA-Bench}, to our knowledge the first large-scale benchmark for evaluating LALMs on underwater acoustic signal recognition. It comprises 375,051 audio records that couple parameterized sources with modeled propagation, so that every record can be traced to the conditions that produced it. The records span these three signal families, and each carries a three-level label hierarchy (13 leaf classes), a templated multi-turn dialogue, and source and channel metadata. We evaluate on a balanced 2,600-record subset with a gated coarse-to-fine protocol that locates each error at source routing, fine-grained classification, or output format, and add a paired silent-audio control to test whether the waveform is actually used. Nine open LALMs, evaluated without task-specific adaptation, reach only 2.0\%--13.1\% leaf accuracy, against a random reference of 7.7\%. The waveform helps source routing far more than leaf recognition (for one model, +29.5 versus +2.3 points over silence), and just four models gain reliably at the leaf level, by at most 4.7 points. UA-Bench thus gives a reference point for these models, and its released training partition supports follow-up adaptation work.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.16942
Deepfake speech detectors are typically evaluated as binary classifiers on fixed benchmarks, but deployed systems face evolving attacks, codecs, speakers, and recording conditions, with labels unavailable during operation. This makes it difficult to know when a detector operates in familiar conditions and can be relied on. We propose an unsupervised drift monitor that operates on the internal embeddings of a deployed detector. The monitor compares each input against bona fide and spoof references using regularized Mahalanobis distances. These distances define trusted, ambiguous, and novel regions of the detector embedding space, allowing unfamiliar inputs to be routed for review. We evaluate the monitor on four modern detectors on three datasets. The monitor raises alerts for dataset mismatches and substantially reduces the security-critical case of accepting deepfakes at the cost of reduced automatic coverage. The results also show that drift affects both classes: bona fide recordings can move away from the training reference, increasing alert rates even in in-domain settings. Our findings suggest that deployed deepfake speech detectors should be treated not only as a binary classification, but also as a reliability problem.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.16826
Adversarial detection on evolving attributed graphs faces two challenges: fraud labels arrive late or not at all, and natural distributional drift erodes any trained decision boundary. Modern detectors can reach strong detection rates when labels are available and the distribution is stationary; sustaining that quality without labels and under drift is the open problem. We identify feature-context consistency -- the alignment between a node's attributes and its aggregated neighborhood attributes -- as a single structural signal that addresses both. We formalize it as the Context Boost (CB) score within a Restricted Boltzmann Machine framework (CB-RBM) and prove two complementary worst-case guarantees: a strict separation between the expected CB of legitimate and adversarial nodes, with gap growing linearly in model capacity, whenever the adversary's context stays far enough from legitimate neighborhood context; and a Wasserstein-Lipschitz bound on how far the CB distribution moves under natural drift. We validate on XBlock Ethereum phishing (~153K nodes) and Reddit banned-user detection (~11K nodes), with two further datasets in the appendix spanning diverse domains. With zero labels, CB-RBM achieves AUROC >= 0.96 on four adversarial attacks and keeps FPR close to its calibrated 5% target under drift -- outperforming supervised GNNs (hundreds of labels), unsupervised graph-anomaly baselines, and a standard RBM whose FPR collapses to 89-100%. What typically requires separate mechanisms -- label-free operation and drift stability -- here follows from a single structural regularity of the data. Code: this https URL.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.16694
An LLM agent using tools can fail silently. It stops before the task is done, raises no error, and answers fluently. Two kinds of monitor address this, one deciding whether a run failed and the other naming the step where failure became unavoidable. Much of the reported performance on both tasks comes from regularities that need no model. Failing runs are longer, and the step labelled decisive is usually the last. A rule that always names the last step is correct $67\%$ to $96\%$ of the time here, without reading the run at all. That ceiling reflects how the labels were written, not how agents break. On failures whose decisive step replay can confirm, it falls to near chance. Reporting gain over that rule therefore changes what a score means. Under that correction, methods tested here gain nothing on give-up failures, while several published systems keep a clear advantage on other splits. For detection, the agent's internal states beat transcript length and text similarity on the agent benchmark, and hold up where the text baseline does not. Precision stays low when failures are rare, so such a monitor should rank runs for review, not replace it.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.16661
Pseudonymous accounts and complex smart-contract ecosystems substantially hinder the tracing of illicit cryptocurrency fund flows. Existing Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have achieved promising performance in blockchain fraud detection, yet their static node- or edge-level predictions do not naturally generalize to multi-hop fund tracing. Meanwhile, existing tracing methods mainly rely on predefined heuristics to capture multi-hop relationships, limiting their adaptive reasoning capabilities. To bridge this gap, we introduce CryptoFlowBench, a benchmark constructed from authoritative reports on cryptocurrency-related illicit incidents, with four tasks spanning local to multi-hop fund tracing. These tasks pose substantial challenges to existing learning- and heuristic-based methods, particularly in complex multi-hop scenarios. We therefore propose ChainSleuth, a graph-tool-augmented agent that iteratively reasons, invokes graph tools, and updates its tracing trajectory, enabling adaptive information acquisition and recovery from erroneous paths. Experiments show that no baseline consistently dominates all four tasks, revealing substantial gaps between local fraud detection and multi-hop fund tracing. ChainSleuth achieves notable improvements on multi-hop tasks, demonstrating the potential of agentic graph reasoning for cryptocurrency fund investigation.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.16449
Time series (TS) anomaly detection (AD) lacks a universal detector, with the best choice determined by the series rather than by the algorithm. Existing methods therefore either select one detector for each series or average a pool of them. However, both assume that no label ever arrives, while a deployed monitor does receive them, since an operator confirms the alarms it raises. In this paper, we propose ONESHOT, which uses a single confirmed anomaly to weight the pool rather than to choose one detector from it. Specifically, we score each detector on the confirmed anomaly, and those scores become the weights of a soft mixture over the whole pool. We show that a single confirmed anomaly is enough to come close to the best detector for the series. Across 152 univariate and 73 multivariate series, ONESHOT outperforms the strongest single detector, averaging the whole pool, and even picking the best detector on the confirmed event. Code is available at: this https URL.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.16219
Although post-training significantly enhances model performance, the use of massive undisclosed data raises concerns about benchmark contamination and copyright infringement. This drives growing interest in training data detection for post-trained models. Existing evaluations for training data detection often leverage benchmarks constructed post hoc, which can introduce distribution shifts. Alternatively, controlled evaluations rely on small-scale training setups that diverge from realistic post-training settings. As a result, their reported performance may not faithfully reflect the effectiveness of detection methods in real-world scenarios. To this end, we introduce \textsc{\method}, a reliable benchmark designed to evaluate detection methods in realistic, large-scale post-training settings. Built on a multi-stage pipeline, \method\space encompasses stage-specific models throughout the post-training lifecycle, spanning SFT, DPO, and RL. To perform a reliable evaluation, we construct model-specific evaluation sets across four diverse tasks, featuring distribution-matched members and non-members with verifiable membership labels. Our results reveal that even the best-performing method achieves an average AUC of only 0.529 on our benchmark, which approaches random-guessing level (0.5). Furthermore, our analysis suggests that evaluation protocols can significantly affect measured detection performance. These findings highlight the significant potential for developing effective, practical, and robust detection methods under realistic scenarios.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.16152
LLM agents increasingly operate over multiple entities, where reliable response generation requires not only retrieving relevant evidence but also preserving its association with the correct entity. We identify Phantom Merge (PM), an entity-evidence binding failure in which an agent attributes unsupported claims to its committed entity, potentially even when the task is completed correctly. We formalize PM at the claim level and characterize its prevalence and error subtypes across four agent domains and four backbone families. To address this problem, we propose a two-stage framework for claim-level risk estimation and correction. First, Anchor-Grounded Risk (AGR) combines a representational readout of the agent's pre-emission hidden state with Jacobian-based functional information, providing complementary slot-level and anchor-value risk scores. Second, Fixed-Anchor Correction (FAC) audits flagged claims and selectively revises them using observed anchor evidence or removes them when no supported replacement is available. On the held-out Shopping detection cohort, AGR-slot achieves an AUROC of 96.2% and an average precision of 97.3%, outperforming the evaluated detection baselines. In the end-to-end Shopping mitigation evaluation, FAC reduces trajectory-level PM from 51.4% to 6.2%, with an output-to-original claim ratio of 80.7%. These results demonstrate the prevalence of entity-specific grounding failures and the effectiveness of combining internal risk estimation with evidence-constrained claim correction. Our code is publicly available at this https URL.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.16141
Existing audio deepfake detection (ADD) methods frequently exhibit limited generalization, as fixed bottleneck architectures fail to adapt to the heterogeneous information densities inherent in diverse spoofing artifacts. Moreover, standard augmentation often leads to a pathological robustness-accuracy trade-off. In this paper, we propose a unified ADD framework to address these challenges. Our approach integrates: (1) an Adaptive Audio Feature Integration (AAFI) module that dynamically selects optimal latent dimensions via a compression pool and a stochastic exploration mechanism, ensuring flexible representations across multiple types of dynamic attacks; and (2) a Mel-Band Adversarial Perturbation (Mel-BAP) strategy that applies targeted regularization in the mel-spectrogram domain to encourage the model to learn invariant decision boundaries. Extensive evaluations on benchmarks including ADD 2022, FakeOrReal, and In-the-Wild demonstrate that our model based on Whisper-small achieves a state-of-the-art average Equal Error Rate (EER) of 1.51%. Compared to existing SOTA models such as the 3-billion-parameter Resemble-Detect-3B-Omni, our framework reduces the parameter count by up to 91.6% while achieving a 60.7% improvement in average EER. In a separate cross-lingual evaluation, the Whisper-base configuration achieves EERs of 3.91-5.65% on five unseen languages. The framework also maintains strong resilience to real-world acoustic distortions. This work provides a scalable and efficient "plug-in" solution for enhancing trust and security in the audio Web ecosystem.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.16049
Large language models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success across a wide range of language tasks. At their core, autoregressive LLMs are conditional probability models that learn to approximate the next-token distribution given the preceding context. Despite this probabilistic nature, the stochastic dynamics of autoregressive decoding have rarely been investigated from a rigorous probabilistic perspective. In this work, we define the per-step prediction error as the difference between the sampled token indicator and the model's conditional predictive distribution, and prove that the cumulative error process is a martingale with respect to the decoding filtration, implying that its conditional first-order moment is identically zero. Beyond this first-order property, we derive a closed-form expression for the second-order behavior of the martingale sequence: its predictable quadratic variation reduces to $\sum_t\left(1-p(y_t\mid y_{<t})\right)$, computable from realized token probabilities alone. This identity establishes a direct theoretical connection between sequence fluctuations and predictive uncertainty during autoregressive decoding. White-box experiments on Llama-3.x and Qwen2.5 families (1B to 72B parameters) verify that the empirically measured second-order moments closely match the theoretical predictions derived from our martingale analysis. These results provide a probabilistic framework for analyzing autoregressive LLM decoding, reveal intrinsic probabilistic fingerprints of different language models, and establish a rigorous mathematical foundation for LLM-generated text detection and uncertainty quantification.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.16041
Multi-agent LLM systems (MALS) introduce a privacy-leakage problem that conventional sensitivity-based defenses miss, since information disclosed to one authorized agent can propagate through routine coordination to an unauthorized one, without compromise or malicious behavior. This motivates topology-aware enforcement that blocks unauthorized propagation while preserving authorized disclosure. We evaluate 485 scenarios across coordinator-worker, peer-to-peer, and hierarchical topologies, instrumenting seven communication channels and measuring surface leakage and disclosure to topology-introduced recipients. We introduce RECONS, a Detect -> Decide -> Transform sanitizer conditioning intervention on recipient and execution context rather than sensitivity alone. Topology changes where protected information propagates, with disclosure to topology-introduced recipients rising from 0% to 52.2% while surface leakage stays nearly flat at 60.6-62.8%. This effect persists across four generator models and a second orchestration framework, though magnitude and relay paths differ; framework choice separately drives a 150x leakage spread, so topology alone is not sufficient. RECONS reduces residual disclosure from 96.7% without sanitization to 29.25%, preserving 94.1% of authorized disclosures versus 20.5% under blanket redaction. Detection coverage is the dominant bottleneck, accounting for 95.5% of residual disclosures. These results show that privacy enforcement in MALS must reason about the recipient and communication path realized at runtime, not sensitivity or topology assumptions alone.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.16039
Ransomware is a fast-escalating privacy threat causing significant financial and data losses worldwide. As attacks grow more sophisticated, traditional static signatures and dynamic behavior analysis struggle to defend. In this paper, we propose an novel framework that couples software-level scanning with hardware-level microprocessor activity monitoring to achieve efficient ransomware detection and mitigation. The contributions are threefold: (1) we employ adversarial training to harden static analysis against obfuscation and leverage hardware-assisted monitoring for real-time detection; (2) we integrate neural architecture search (NAS) to automatically tailor models for stronger generalizability; and (3) We validate the proposed approach through extensive experiments, demonstrating substantially improved detection accuracy and reduced latency compared with existing methods. Moreover, it provides trace-level interpretability that explains the underlying decision process.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.15951
Text wrapped in a trigger can be made behaviorally invisible to a language model: omitted from summaries and quotations, ignored in question answering, and left unflagged by downstream filtering. We study this selective blindness as a dual-use information-flow primitive, a supply-chain backdoor, and a white-box auditing problem. We first implement it exactly as a serving-time span veto: blocking information flow out of a marked span makes every outside activation bit-identical under same-length substitution of the span's content, a noninterference property we verify across ten models, seven mixer families, and 0.5B-120B parameters. The veto serves as a deployable quarantine, an exact reference for calibrating leakage, and a teacher. Distilled into weights, it yields a backdoor: checkpoints trained on six model families from 4B to 120B ignore marked context at little benchmark cost, and their outputs show no measurable semantic trace of the suppressed content above the veto reference on our held-out suite; an in-domain variant suppresses planted vulnerabilities during AI code review. Detection is therefore a white-box problem. Simpler backdoors remain internally transparent -- linear probes recover suppressed content at 0.57-0.79 accuracy versus 0.025 chance -- but hardening the attack until probes reach chance collapses attention from outside the span into it below the range of base models. Across the attacks we evaluate, probe visibility trades off against routing visibility; we do not establish that this tradeoff is fundamental.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.15883