Abstract
Machine learning algorithms are being used in high-stakes decisions, including those in criminal justice, healthcare, credit, and employment. The research community has responded with two largely independent research fields: \emph{algorithmic fairness}, which targets equitable outcomes, and \emph{explainable AI} (XAI), which targets interpretable reasoning. This survey identifies and maps a novel blind spot at their intersection, which is a model that can satisfy every standard fairness criterion in its outputs while being profoundly unfair in its \emph{reasoning process}. We refer to this as the procedural bias, and mitigating it requires treating the fairness of explanations as a distinct object of scientific study. To our knowledge, we provide the first unified theoretical and literature review of this emerging field and elucidate the drawbacks of post-hoc explainers in certifying explanation fairness. Our central contribution is a \emph{conditional invariance framework} formalizing explanation fairness as the requirement that explanations should be indifferent regardless of the protected attributes $ P(E(X) \in \cdot \mid X_\text{rel} = x_\text{rel},\, A = a) = P(E(X) \in \cdot \mid X_\text{rel} = x_\text{rel},\, A = b)$ for all task-relevant $x$, a single principle from which all existing explanation fairness metrics emerge as partial operationalizations. We introduce a seven-dimensional taxonomy, identify three generative mechanisms of explanation inequity (representation-driven, explanation-model mismatch, actionability-driven), and propose a canonical six-step evaluation workflow for operationalizing explanation fairness audits in practice.
Abstract (translated)
URL
https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.09852
