Abstract
Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has emerged as a dominant paradigm for enhancing large language models with external knowledge. By coupling retrieval mechanisms with generative models, RAG systems improve factual grounding and adaptability across domains. However, integrating retrieval pipelines introduces new security and privacy risks that extend beyond conventional language modeling threats. Sensitive information may be exposed through retrieval indices, query logs, context construction, or federated updates, while adversarial manipulation of knowledge bases can undermine trust in generated outputs. This survey provides a comprehensive examination of privacy and security challenges across RAG systems deployed in centralized, on-device (Micro-RAG), federated, and hybrid paradigms. We present a unified taxonomy of threat surfaces spanning the retrieval, context construction, and generation stages and systematically analyze attack classes, including membership inference, index inference, poisoning, gradient leakage, and collusion. We further review architectural, algorithmic, and cryptographic defenses, highlighting privacy-utility trade-offs and deployment considerations. Finally, we outline open research challenges toward building trustworthy, secure, and resilient RAG systems for real-world applications.
Abstract (translated)
URL
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.25533
