Abstract
Across law, education, policy analysis, and public moral argumentation, LLM outputs are being used often for work that requires interpretations to be justified with textual evidence and explicit normative standards. Yet a recurrent failure mode -- what I call \textit{interpretive misplacement} -- is that model-generated readings get treated as settled meanings without an explicit interpretive frame (sources, scope constraints, normative commitments), without preserving defensible alternatives, and without provenance that lets readers find the supporting passages. In such settings, the risk is not only factual error but lost accountability: readers and institutions cannot reliably assess what an output commits them to, or on what basis. Drawing on philosophical hermeneutics, this paper discusses this risk and derives design principles for structuring human-AI co-interpretation. The paper also provides a structured synthesis of recent scholarship on hermeneutics and AI, organizing this emerging literature into a set of recurrent lines of argument and design-relevant gaps. LLM outputs are treated as candidate readings, whereas hermeneutic understanding is reserved for accountable human interpreters situated in disciplinary historical-linguistic traditions. Human-AI interaction is characterized as an AI-mediated interpretive loop. Hermeneutic understanding is distinguished from token-prediction--based text generation. On this basis, existing LLM techniques are reorganized into design patterns for hermeneutically responsible use in interpretive settings. Finally, the discussion turns to implications for legal practice, educational assessment and feedback, scholarly knowledge production, and public moral argumentation. It also treats digital hermeneutics as a literacy: the capacity to read AI-mediated texts by examining frames, provenance, and readings, and by contesting outputs.
Abstract (translated)
URL
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.00334
