Abstract
The threat that AI persuasion poses to human control has been acknowledged in the literature, but not yet systematically studied. Now that persuasion attacks are no longer theoretical - with Anthropic's Claude Mythos 5 recently making headlines for trying to convince people involved in an open-source project to merge malicious code during an evaluation - there is a pressing need to deeply analyze this threat. We undertake that effort here. In particular, we analyze how AI could persuade humans in key settings (e.g. safety-relevant R&D within frontier labs) toward decisions that compromise the development, containment, oversight, and governance of AI itself. In doing so, we elucidate a framework for characterizing this threat, develop five concrete scenarios using this framework, and provide a blueprint for assessing the associated risks. Using this blueprint, we conduct an initial risk estimation survey with select researchers and find that their opinions on which scenarios are riskiest are highly mixed. Their disagreements stem from differing opinions about the effectiveness of AI persuasion in different contexts, and point to the need for follow-up risk elicitation studies and persuasion evaluations, which we outline. Our hope is that this paper highlights the risks from AI persuasion undermining control, and provides a path forward for future research.
Abstract (translated)
URL
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.14796
