Abstract
LLM agents translate natural-language context, which may include attacker-controlled text, into privileged tool calls, so authorization must remain effective even when an agent is prompt-injected or adversarially steered. The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has become a widely adopted interface for this boundary, yet its official SDKs' authentication and authorization primitives fall short of enterprise zero-trust requirements, most acutely a dual-persona model in which one server must serve human users (corporate SSO) and automated agents (service-account credentials on a different header). We conduct a systematic gap analysis of six surveyed MCP SDKs (Python, TypeScript, Go, Rust, C#, Swift) and identify three structural shortcomings: credential extraction bound to a single Authorization header, complicating dual-persona deployment without custom middleware; the absence of pre-authentication tool discovery; and the lack of fine-grained per-tool authorization in the base SDKs. We close these gaps with composable extensions to FastMCP: cross-header credential normalization for enterprise deployments serving both human and service-account callers, cached token verification across heterogeneous IdPs, an unauthenticated metadata endpoint for credential-free registry discovery, and permission-filtered tool visibility kept consistent with per-tool invocation enforcement by a single declarative annotation, all without modifying the protocol or SDK internals. Across four frontier LLMs over 2160 attempts, an in-body-check-only server still exposes forbidden tools (152/720, 21.1%), whereas permission-aware visibility drives the rate to 0/720; visibility-only filtering remained bypassable by scripted clients, while models referenced the hidden tool by name in up to 94% of settings when inferable from the prompt, confirming that discovery controls cannot replace invocation-time enforcement.
Abstract (translated)
URL
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.22573
