Abstract
Effective human-AI collaboration requires partners to establish references through interaction, which becomes fragile when descriptions are ambiguous, similar referents compete, or partners see different things. We study referential uncertainty - uncertainty over which candidate object a description refers to - in a collaborative puzzle task where a human Helper instructs an AI Worker to place pieces. The Worker must identify and communicate its uncertainty, and the Helper must recognize and act on it. We show that a separately elicited belief distribution over candidate pieces is better calibrated (ECE 0.15) and better discriminates correct from incorrect placements (AUROC 0.65) than raw action-token probabilities, which are severely overconfident (0.97 mean confidence, ECE 0.44). Across three frontier vision-language models (GPT-4.1, GPT-5, GPT-5.5), this elicited uncertainty rises predictably with instruction vagueness, but not with competing referents in context, even when those increase errors. The models seldom externalize it, asking for clarification on only 3.5-16.7% of turns. In a controlled human study (N=210), participants given only the Worker's default message accept 78% of wrong placements and cannot tell right from wrong (AUC 0.50). Precise descriptions and, especially, well-targeted hedges cut wrong-move acceptance to 36% while largely preserving correct-move acceptance, compensating for missing shared awareness such as not seeing the Worker's action. But this benefit depends on targeting: a deployable hedge derived from the model's own belief entropy inherits that signal's weakness and can do more harm than good. Externalized uncertainty helps a human partner only when it is accurately targeted.
Abstract (translated)
URL
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.39518
