Abstract
Many collective-action systems are neither fully decentralized nor fully centralized: agents voluntarily organize into institutions that share organizational costs and delegate decisions to representatives. Delegation can reduce individual costs, but it also transfers control to representatives whose private objectives need not align with those of their constituents. We study this tension in a repeated game with endogenous delegation to self-interested centers. A simple reduced-form model yields a scale--accountability tradeoff: larger constituencies offer greater cost-sharing benefits to members, yet the marginal value to a center of retaining any one constituent decreases as group size grows. Consequently, the prospect of individual exit can sustain non-exploitative delegation only up to an endogenous accountable constituency size. Additionally, we identify parameter regions in which fully delegated, accountable governance, when feasible, must be polycentric. We investigate these predictions through simulations with large language model (LLM) agents. Across five matched pairs of 30-agent simulations, polycentric structures repeatedly emerge but remain fluid, exhibiting cycles of concentration, exploitation, exit, and re-formation. We further find that models of different capacity exhibit similar willingness to assume leadership but differ substantially in their exercise of authority, with Sol initiating exploitation more frequently than Luna in matched decision states.
Abstract (translated)
URL
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.21746
